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ESSAY
WHAT’S WRONG WITH POLICE UNIONS?
Benjamin Levin*
In an era of declining labor power, police unions stand as a success
story for worker organizing—they exert political clout and negotiate
favorable terms for their members. Yet, despite support for unionization
on the political left, police unions have become public enemy number one
for commentators concerned about race and police violence. Much criticism of police unions focuses on their obstructionism and their prioritization of members’ interests over the interests of the communities they police.
These critiques are compelling. But, taken seriously, they often sound like
critiques of unions in general, not just police unions. If public-sector unionism remains a social good, wholeheartedly embracing these critiques seems
like a risky proposition.
This Essay examines the strange case of police unions and asks how
they are (and are not) representative of U.S. unionism. More pointedly,
this Essay asks what critiques of police unions should mean for policing
reform and the future of public-sector unionism. How are police unions
different from other public-sector unions, and how might critiques of
police unions apply to other public-sector unions?
Ultimately, I argue that the challenge in articulating a theory of
what makes police unions different highlights both the problem with police
and the problem with how scholars think about unions. If police unions
are objectionable because of their views and police conduct, this concern
speaks to a problem with police—full stop. The problems with unions are
only issues by extension. If the unions are objectionable because they
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prioritize their members’ interests, the critiques are properly understood
as undercutting public-sector unions generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Union power in the United States has hit a nadir. Less than eleven
percent of the labor force is unionized—a lower percentage than at any
point since World War II.1 Twenty-eight states (including six since 2000)
have passed “right to work” laws that restrict the ability of unions to collect
dues from workers and reach exclusive agreements with employers.2 Recent
years have seen union opponents aggressively (and often successfully) litigate claims that would make it much more difficult for unions to organize

1. See, e.g., Jake Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do 1 (2014); Kate Andrias,
The New Labor Law, 126 Yale L.J. 2, 5 (2016) [hereinafter Andrias, The New Labor Law]
(“American labor unions have collapsed. While they once bargained for more than a third
of American workers, unions now represent only about a tenth of the labor market and even
less of the private sector.”); Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—
2019 (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TM8P-86WU].
2. See Right to Work States Timeline, Nat’l Right to Work Comm., http://www.nrtw.org/
right-to-work-states [https://perma.cc/CR5B-XVG2] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
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workers and raise money.3 At the same time, “gig economy” companies,
globalization, and the forces of neoliberalism have undermined worker
solidarity and the logic of labor law.4 Despite signiﬁcant donations to
Democratic political campaigns, unions have had limited success in convincing politicians on either side of the aisle to prioritize positions or push
for legislation that speciﬁcally beneﬁts organized labor and its members.5
But not all unions are similarly situated, and not all have ﬂoundered.
As private-sector unions have struggled, some public-sector unions remain
powerful political forces, extracting concessions from government employers and steering policies to beneﬁt their members.6 Enter an incongruous
manifestation of contemporary labor’s power: the police union.
In many ways, police unions ﬂout both traditional assumptions about
organized labor and contemporary framings of the new labor movement.7
Where unions often swing left, police unions swing right.8 Where much

3. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2486 (2018); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1083 (2016) (mem.)
(per curiam); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 655–56 (2014); Unite Here Local 355 v.
Mulhall, 571 U.S. 83, 83 (2013) (mem.) (per curiam); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 321–23 (2012).
4. See, e.g., David Graeber, The Globalization Movement: Some Points of
Clariﬁcation, in The Anthropology of Development and Globalization: From Classical
Political Economy to Contemporary Neoliberalism 169, 169–70 (Marc Edelman &
Angelique Haugerud eds., 2005); Raphael Kaplinsky, Globalization, Poverty and Inequality:
Between a Rock and a Hard Place 163–232 (2005); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Free
Trade Reimagined: The World Division of Labor and the Method of Economics 193–
98 (2007); V.B. Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, Regulation, and
Labor Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi and Uber Economies, 38 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab.
L. 73, 76 (2017); Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 Iowa L. Rev.
445, 454–55 (2017); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting
Back to Basics, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 479, 480–81 (2016); Noah D. Zatz, Does Work Law
Have a Future if the Labor Market Does Not?, 91 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1081, 1111–14 (2016).
5. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, “The More Things Change, . . .”: Reﬂections on the
Stasis of Labor Law in the United States, 56 Vill. L. Rev. 227, 227–28 (2011) (recounting
the failure of Democratic administrations to advance the legislative interests of organized
labor); Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law
Reform, 63 Hastings L.J. 695, 698 (2012) (“[L]abor law reform has been a failed promise
under the previous two Democratic administrations, and likely will be under the current
one as well.”).
6. See Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 1, at 5 n.2, 21; Jon D. Michaels,
Privatization’s Progeny, 101 Geo. L.J. 1023, 1045 (2013) (“Government employees have
fared far better than their counterparts in the private sector, where effective unionization
has long been in a state of free fall. But . . . [l]abor scholars urge observers not to be misled
by the comparatively rosy picture that stable public-sector union membership seems to
paint.”).
7. But see Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski, The Public Sector Look of
American Unionism, in When Public Sector Workers Unionize 1, 1 (Richard B. Freeman
& Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988) (“Unions of ﬁre ﬁghters and police were well-established as
exemplars of the craft-type organizations that once dominated American labor.”).
8. See infra section II.B.
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modern labor organizing focuses on low-wage workers, police unions protect higher-wage professionals.9 Where unionism and antiracism sometimes
have travelled hand-in-hand,10 police unions still represent predominantly
white workers and frequently take public stands that are hostile to racial
justice or that express outright racism.11 Indeed, after decades of disinterest, scholars recently have begun to study police unions because of their
role in hampering criminal justice reform, shielding officers accused of
violence against people of color, and defending racially disparate policing
practices.12 In a moment when labor law scholarship tends to treat the
interests of unions and the political left as inextricably linked,13 police
unions provide a powerful counterexample. Or do they?

9. See infra section III.D.
10. See Eric Schickler, Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American
Liberalism, 1932–1965, at 1–13 (2016) (“The CIO and its allies fused ‘class’ and ‘race’ in
an alignment that was forged amid the vast social and ideological turmoil of the 1930s and
early 1940s.”); infra section III.D. But see Reuel Schiller, Forging Rivals: Race, Class, Law,
and the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism 1–12 (2015) (introducing the collapse of the
alliance between civil rights groups and labor unions in the San Francisco Bay Area in the
1960s).
11. See Paul Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police Must Go, Nation (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-fraternal-order-of-police-must-go [https://perma.cc/
SRD9-6GB4] [hereinafter Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police] (“The FOP’s national
leadership consists of seven white men . . . . [This] is striking in an organization that claims
that 30 percent of its members are officers of color. And many local chapters appear to be
run by white cops—even in cities with police forces that are predominantly of color.”).
12. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 712, 713–22 (2017); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Mich. L. Rev.
761, 813–15 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, Problem of Policing]; Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H.
McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to
Delay Investigation, 2016 U. Chi. Legal Forum 213, 238–39; Kate Levine, Police Suspects,
116 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1222 (2016) [hereinafter Levine, Police Suspects]; Marcia L.
McCormick, Our Uneasiness with Police Unions: Power and Voice for the Powerful?, 35 St.
Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 47, 54–63 (2015); Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167
U. Pa. L. Rev. 545, 557–61 (2019); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 Duke
L.J. 1191, 1222–39 (2017) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Union Contracts]; Stephen Rushin,
Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 1343,
1404–05 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation]; Joanna C. Schwartz,
Police Indemniﬁcation, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 938–47 (2014); Seth W. Stoughton, The
Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 2179, 2206 (2014) [hereinafter
Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing]; Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H.
McAdams & John Rappaport, Collective Bargaining and Police Misconduct: Evidence from
Florida 2–3 (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 831,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095217 [https://perma.cc/VTN3-6JVC]; Maybell
Romero, Prosecutors and Police: An Unholy Union 7–16 (Sept. 7, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447669 [https://perma.cc/4SBH-XVPC].
13. See, e.g., Andrias, The New Labor Law, supra note 1, at 32–37; Benjamin I. Sachs,
The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 Yale L.J. 148, 168–71
(2013) [hereinafter Sachs, Unbundled Union]. But see generally Thaddeus Russell, Out
of the Jungle: Jimmy Hoffa and the Remaking of the American Working Class (2003)
[hereinafter Russell, Out of the Jungle] (critiquing left labor historians and arguing that
the labor movement should be understood in terms of worker self-interest).
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This Essay examines the strange case of police unions and asks how
they are (and are not) representative of U.S. unionism. More pointedly,
this Essay asks what increasingly common critiques of police unions should
mean for policing reform and the future of public-sector unionism. In an
effort to construct a more nuanced picture of police unions’ functions,
this Essay situates the role of police unions within two disparate scholarly
debates: (1) the literature on policing reform and (2) the literature on
public-sector unions. How are police unions different from other publicsector unions, and how might critiques and defenses of public-sector
unions apply to police unions? Can scholars of policing avoid questions
that plague (or deﬁne) the literature on the rights and social power of
workers? Can labor law scholars continue to speak of “labor” as a monolith
without grappling with the problematic aspects of police unions? And, perhaps more pointedly, how much does scholarly and political discomfort
with police unions reﬂect a deeper discomfort with unions that are powerful and with collective action by workers other than the most marginalized?
In tackling organized labor’s place in law enforcement, this Essay
engages with an emerging literature that takes police unions seriously as a
signiﬁcant component of the modern criminal system.14 For decades, criminal procedure scholars have focused on judicial opinions as deﬁning and
shaping police practices.15 They framed the law of policing in terms of constitutional decisions rendered by appellate judges.16 Formal and informal
rules crafted outside of the courtroom by municipalities, police unions,
and police departments had little place in the scholarly discourse surrounding and critiquing police misconduct.17 But, spurred by the rise of the
14. See supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1133, 1134–36 (1982); Yale Kamisar, Looking
Back on the “Stone Age” of Criminal Procedure, 13 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 471, 472 (2016);
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 1488–95 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The
Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 189–95 (1983); Dan M.
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo.
L.J. 1153, 1158 (1998) (noting the Supreme Court’s strategy not to confront race directly
but instead confront it with “general constitutional standards that d[o] not explicitly
address race”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 3 (1997) (ﬁnding that the scholarly literature on the
rules of criminal procedure focuses largely on constitutional debates and judicial glosses,
providing only a limited picture of a larger system that doesn’t play by the rules). But see
Rachel Harmon, Reconsidering Criminal Procedure: Teaching the Law of the Police, 60 St.
Louis U. L.J. 391, 392–96 (2016) (emphasizing how much of the regulation of police comes
from nonconstitutional sources, such as state legislatures, labor and employment law,
common law doctrines of entrapment, and local ordinances).
17. But see Stephen C. Halpern, Police Employee Organizations and Accountability
Procedures in Three Cities: Some Reﬂections on Police Policy-Making, 8 Law & Soc’y Rev.
561, 561–77 (1973) (“Through litigation and the threat of litigation, such civil liberties as
the right to criticize department policy or superiors, to join unorthodox organizations and
to participate in political affairs, are being developed.”); David Alan Sklansky, Police and
Democracy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1752–53 (2005) (describing the limited discussion
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Movement for Black Lives18 and greater public access to police union
contracts,19 police unions and their collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs) are becoming a bigger part of the conversation.20
Although commentators focused on police unions may have different
approaches and political commitments, they tend to articulate similar
critiques. Much criticism of police unions focuses on their obstructionist
nature and how they prioritize the interests of their members over the
interests of the public at large and the communities they police.21 These
critiques are compelling—police unions shield officers and block outsider
intervention in the regulation of policing. But, taken seriously, they sound
like critiques of unions in general, not just police unions.22 To the extent that
public-sector unionism remains a social good because of concerns for
economic inequality and worker power,23 wholeheartedly embracing these
critiques seems like a risky proposition. To the extent that the critiques of
police unions ring true, are these critiques of unions, police, or local government decisionmaking? How we answer this question is not simply a matter
of theoretical consistency;24 it should be an essential component of determining what “police reform” should look like and also of understanding
surrounding reform of police departments). See generally Samuel Walker, The Neglect of
Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas of American Policing, 9 Police
Prac. & Res. 95, 103 (2008) [hereinafter Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions] (“The
related issues of the police subculture and of organizational cultures within police
departments have not received sufficient scholarly attention.”).
18. See generally About Us, Movement for Black Lives, https://policy.m4bl.org [https://
perma.cc/J5ER-YDE7] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (“In response to the sustained and
increasingly visible violence against Black communities in the U.S. and globally, . . . more
than 50 organizations . . . have come together with renewed energy and purpose to articulate
a common vision and agenda.”).
19. See, e.g., Police Union Contract Project, Check the Police, http://
www.checkthepolice.org/#project [https://perma.cc/S693-R3KL] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020);
see also Stephen Cohen, The Next Fight for Racial Justice: Police Union Reform, New
Republic (Dec. 2, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/124811/next-fight-racial-justicepolice-union-reform [https://perma.cc/76NN-B7TY].
20. See supra note 12.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the Government Like A Business”:
Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 Yale L.J. Online 39, 67 (2011)
[hereinafter Fischl, Running the Government] (“[S]o long as we live in a world in which
corporate contributors enjoy a considerable capacity to shape the scope and direction of
our politics, it seems . . . that the countervailing voice provided by public and privatesector unions on behalf of working people is a necessary and undeniable good.”); Anne
Marie Lofaso, In Defense of Public-Sector Unions, 28 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 301, 308
(2011) (“[U]nions, including public-sector unions, are vital to a well-functioning
democracy and therefore should be protected.”).
24. See Rick Hills, How Enthusiastically Should the Left Support Laws and
Doctrines Protecting Public Employee Unions?, PrawfsBlawg (Sept. 2, 2018), http://
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/09/how-enthusiastically-should-the-left-supportlaws-and-doctrines-protecting-public-employee-unions.html#more [https://perma.cc/7YPPEF3F].
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the role of police, unions, and the state in the criminal system and its
attendant race- and class-based hierarchies.
In addressing these questions, my argument unfolds in four Parts.
Part I describes the dominant critique of police unions. This Part focuses
on the image of the union as unaccountable, obstructionist, and conservative.25 Further, this Part situates these critiques within a broader set of
concerns about police violence against people of color and other marginalized communities. Part II resituates police unions (and such critiques)
within a different set of scholarly and political debates—those regarding
the role of public-sector unions. In this Part, I argue that the critiques
articulated in Part I resonate with the work of anti-union forces on the
political right and among technocratic or neoliberal voices on the left. By
way of analogy, in this Part I focus on teachers’ unions and other controversial public-sector unions. Part III seeks to test this analogy by examining a range of ways in which we might distinguish police unions from other
public-sector unions. This Part asks whether critiques of police unions
could be accurate, while not sweeping in other public-sector unionism or
implicitly supporting a broader anti-union agenda. Perhaps police unions
are just different from other unions for some reason—for example, the
ability to use force against civilians, the social dynamics and power imbalances that make even rank-and-ﬁle officers more like managers (vis-à-vis
civilians), the amount of bargaining power they can exercise, or the
political affiliations of the unions and their members.
Finally, Part IV steps back to identify the weaknesses in these distinctions. Ultimately, I argue that the challenge in articulating a theory of what
makes police unions different highlights the problem with police, the problem with the way scholars think about unions, and the problems with the
critiques of police unions. If what makes police unions objectionable is
their views and/or the conduct of police, this speaks to a problem with
police—full stop. (The problems with the unions are only issues by extension.) Adopting this understanding of the critiques would speak to a
radical vision of police reform—the problem is not that police are unionized but that they have so much power by virtue of constitutional doctrine,
their monopoly on state violence, and so forth. This is a critique that
resonates with the growing literature on police abolition and is properly
understood as a critique of police as an institution. If what makes the
unions and their conduct objectionable is the commitment to their members’ interests over those of the public at large, though, then the critiques
are properly understood as critiques of unions, or of public-sector unions.
Adopting this understanding would make these critiques resonate troublingly with calls for “civil service reform” and dismantling of the union as

25. I use “conservative” here in the small “c” sense (i.e., the unions operate to protect
existing structures and institutions while hampering change). That said, as discussed in
section I.B, infra, critics also focus on the large “C” Conservatism of police unions (i.e., their
affinity or support for Republican politicians and policies favored by the political right).

1340

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1333

a social, political, and economic institution. At the very least, this approach
might suggest that support for unions rests on an image of workers’ collectives as relatively powerless.
I. CRITIQUING POLICE UNIONS
Generally speaking, critiques of police unions reﬂect two focal points:
the obstructionist concern and the ideological concern. Critics treat these
unions as a problem either because (1) they operate as impediment to
reform by opposing speciﬁc policies and shielding officer misconduct; or
(2) they provide political voice to a range of conservative or reactionary
politics that stand in opposition to some desired set of values (e.g., racial
equality, egalitarian democratic movements, etc.). These two critiques occasionally overlap and can have much in common. But, to provide a clear
articulation of the conventional account in the literature and in contemporary policy debates, this Part teases the two critiques apart and addresses
them in turn.26 Critically, though, both of these strands in the literature
reﬂect a general view that police unions operate to the detriment of society
and stand as guardians of the criminal system’s abuses.27
A.

The Obstructionist Critique

The ﬁrst general line of criticism leveled at police unions sounds in
the language of obstruction.28 Advocates and academics are concerned about
police violence and the policing of marginalized communities, and police
unions stand in the way of addressing those concerns.29 This obstruction
26. This Part (and this Essay, more generally) addresses both legal scholarship as well
as more popular commentary that I take to be a part of the broader criminal justice reform
conversation. For similar approaches, see, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward A Radical
Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405, 406 (2018); Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime:
Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-Union Civil RICO Claim, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 559,
568 (2012) [hereinafter Levin, Blue-Collar Crime]; Mariana Valverde, “Miserology”: A New
Look at the History of Criminology, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking 325–27
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
27. While police unions have received scant attention from labor law academics,
Marcia McCormick has brieﬂy begun to trace the contours of police union critiques from a
labor-centric standpoint. See McCormick, supra note 12, at 54–59. This Essay adopts a
different frame, but McCormick’s account is an important contribution to this otherwise
thin literature on police unions as unions.
28. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police 175–83 (2008)
[hereinafter Sklansky, Democracy and the Police] (examining the difficulties presented by
a self-regulating police force and exploring the idea that “giving rank-and-ﬁle officers more
say in how policing is carried out” may achieve results more consistent with the “rule of
law”); Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reform Fails, in Police Reform from the Bottom Up: Officers
and Their Unions as Agents of Change 144, 149 (Monique Marks & David Sklansky
eds., 2012).
29. This critique resonates with a common theme in public discourse, mass culture,
and some legal scholarship of the “blue wall of silence” (i.e., police officers and members
of the law enforcement community are perceived as displaying extreme solidarity with their
coworkers, raising questions of perjury or cover-ups). See, e.g., Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.
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occurs at the macro level (i.e., unions and CBAs prevent the implementation of policies that might increase accountability or oversight)30 and at
the micro level (i.e., unions assist officers charged with misconduct, often
making it harder for oversight organizations or prosecutors to investigate
or prosecute).31
Policing scholar Rachel Harmon describes CBAs as “deter[ring]
department-wide changes intended to prevent constitutional violations . . .
dramatically.”32 Police officer-turned law professor Seth Stoughton suggests that one of the three primary functions of police collective bargaining agreements is to produce “grievance procedures that are often a central
part of collective bargaining agreements [that] both discourage and frustrate
attempts to discipline individual officers.”33 The Movement for Black Lives
and a growing chorus of scholars and activists have emphasized the lack of
police accountability for misconduct.34 Increasingly, commentators concerned with this lack of accountability have turned their gaze to unions
and the collective bargaining agreements that provide officer-friendly procedural rules.35 Certainly, a range of other actors and institutions (e.g.,
464, 467 (1985) (“Due to a code of silence induced by peer pressure among the rank-andﬁle officers and among some police supervisors, few—if any—formal complaints were ever
ﬁled by police personnel.”); Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization
of America’s Police Forces 329 (2013) (“Police unions also help enforce the ‘Blue Code
of Silence,’ the unwritten rule that police officers never rat out or testify against other police
officers.”); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias
and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233, 237 (1998)
(“Police officers also sometimes lie under oath because of the ‘blue wall of silence[]’ . . . .”);
David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 465, 481 n.60 (1992) (“The code of silence has been recognized and documented in
litigation and studies of police culture.”).
30. See Stephen Rushin, A Response to When Police Kill, Berkeley J. Crim. L., Fall
2018, at 96, 98 n.15 (collecting sources).
31. See Eleanor Heard, Are New York Police Officers Safely Playing or Playing It Safe?
Eliminating the Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 133, 157 (2000).
32. Harmon, Problem of Policing, supra note 12, at 799.
33. Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing, supra note 12, at 2211.
34. See, e.g., DeRay McKesson, Samuel Sinyangwe, Johnetta Elzie & Brittany Packnett,
Campaign Zero, Police Union Contracts and Police Bill of Rights Analysis 1 (2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/5773f695f7e0abbdf
e28a1f0/1467217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Union+Contract+Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7D89-L999] (“Police unions across the country have used the collective bargaining
process to circumvent basic tenets of accountability, transparency, and fairness.”); Stephen
Rushin & Allison Garnett, State Labor Law and Federal Police Reform, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1209,
1217 n.43 (2017); Kyle Jaeger, The Black Lives Matter Activists Have a Plan: Campaign Zero,
ATTN: (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.attn.com/stories/2906/what-is-campaign-zero-blacklives-matter [https://perma.cc/MCM7-45K5] (“In order to restore trust between the public
and police, it is crucially important that we impose civilian oversight structures to hold law
enforcement officials accountable.”).
35. See, e.g., Gilbert Rivera, Armed Not Militarized: Achieving Real Police
Militarization, 20 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 227, 235 (2015) (describing “the problem with
police unions” as involving barriers to accountability and a prioritization of job security over
other values); Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 12, at 1376 (“[P]olice
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courts, politicians, and media) might interfere with efforts to police the
police,36 but critics increasingly have identiﬁed unions as erecting particularly high barriers to public oversight.37 (It also may well be that CBAs are
an easier point of entry for reformers than, for example, constitutional
criminal procedure doctrine, which rests on a large body of decisions by
politically unaccountable judges.)
In important recent work, policing scholars have collected and
analyzed a range of police CBAs, helping reformers and scholars appreciate the ways in which these CBAs lay the groundwork for policing and
shield police from public accountability.38 Campaign Zero, a policing reform
organization affiliated with Black Lives Matter,39 has produced extensive
reports outlining police union contracts and law enforcement officer bills
of rights.40 In looking at police CBAs in “81 of the largest U.S. cities,”
Campaign Zero concluded:
Police unions have used their inﬂuence to establish unfair
protections for police officers in their contracts with local, state
and federal government and in statewide Law Enforcement
Officers’ Bills of Rights. These provisions create one set of rules
unions commonly attempt to intervene in settlement negotiations with the intent of
blocking reforms that may increase oversight or otherwise burden frontline police
officers.”); Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 2016 U. Chi. Legal Forum 615, 617 (“The emergence of police unions, and
the collective bargaining agreements they have won, have become a major factor in the
governance of the police.”).
36. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (describing the deferential
standard courts should use in assessing officers’ use of force); Barbara E. Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 453, 469 (2004)
(“[C]ourts evaluating the officer’s beliefs and action are not to engage in 20–20 hindsight,
but to give the beneﬁt of the doubt in close cases to the police.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, The
Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique
of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for Reform, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 743,
745–46 (1995) (discussing the cultural framing of criminal law that treats defendants as
“villains” and law enforcement and prosecutors as heroic).
37. See, e.g., Fair Police Contracts, Campaign Zero, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/
contracts [https://perma.cc/Y4EF-LAV8] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).
38. See Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 Duke L.J. 839, 846, 856–67 (2019)
[hereinafter Levine, Discipline and Policing]; Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra
note 12, at 1198–200. While such work on police union contracts remains a novel development, scholars have done some similar work on state laws regulating police conduct. See
Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis
of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 185, 203–41
(2005) (cataloguing provisions in law officers’ bills of rights).
39. See, e.g., Black Lives Matter Publishes ‘Campaign Zero’ Plan to Reduce Police
Violence, NPR: All Things Considered (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/08/
26/434975505/black-lives-matter-publishes-campaign-zero-plan-to-reduce-police-violence
[https://perma.cc/AV2C-XT4M]; Jon Swaine, Lauren Gambino & Oliver Laughland,
Protesters Unveil Demands for Stricter US Policing Laws as Political Reach Grows, Guardian
(Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/21/protesters-unveilpolice-policy-proposals [https://perma.cc/HH82-AS4E].
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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for police and another for civilians, and make it difficult for
Police Chiefs or civilian oversight structures to punish police
officers who are unﬁt to serve.41
That is, the toothlessness of police oversight is not simply the product of
rights-restricting judicial decisions.42 Rather, feeble accountability mechanisms are the direct result of concerted action by police and a host of
“incidental” regulatory structures.43
Indeed, recognizing this dynamic, some civil rights plaintiffs have
even sought to use CBAs as evidence of unconstitutional departmental
policies.44 For example, in one suit against the city of Chicago, the plaintiff
claimed that “the CBAs between the police unions and the City have essentially turned the code of silence into an official policy.”45 Similarly, the
city’s Police Accountability Task Force concluded:
[T]he code of silence is not just an unwritten rule, or an
unfortunate element of police culture past and present. The
code of silence is institutionalized and reinforced by [Chicago
Police Department] rules and polices that are also baked into the
labor agreements between the various police unions and the
City.46
The union and CBAs, then, operate as markers or structural guarantors of
obstruction and unaccountable policing, particularly as they affect communities of color, poor people, and other marginalized groups.47
41. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42. This court-centric (or, more accurately, Supreme Court-centric) account has long
been a staple of liberal–legalist criminal procedure scholarship. See, e.g., Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 525, 525 (1975);
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153, 214 (2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and
Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5, 9–12 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich.
L. Rev. 2466, 2468 (1996).
43. See Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing, supra note 12, at 2205–16
(tracking the role of CBAs as “incidental regulation of policing”).
44. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Chicago, No. 05 C 6545, 2009 WL 1657547, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. June 9, 2009) (describing a CBA as “undermin[ing] the ability of the police department
to hold its employees accountable for their behavior”).
45. Shields v. City of Chicago, No. 17 C 6689, 2018 WL 1138553, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
2, 2018); see also Taylor v. City of Chicago, No. 17-CV-03642, 2018 WL 4075402, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 27, 2018) (“[T]he existence of this code of silence has been corroborated by the
United States Department of Justice and acknowledged by the president of Chicago’s police
officers union.”).
46. Cazares v. Frugoli, No. 13 C 5626, 2017 WL 1196978, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2017);
see also LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 277 F. Supp. 3d 969, 981 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The entities
of accountability, according to the DOJ report, accept the cover-up culture as an immutable
fact rather than something to root out.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47. See Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 to AFL-CIO (July 25, 2015),
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18240/afl-cio-police-unions-racism-black-livesmatter (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“By unconditionally insulating officers
accused of brutality from facing consequences, police unions maintain the status quo of
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The conﬂict between Philadelphia’s Fraternal Order of Police (FOP)
Local 5 and the city’s reformist District Attorney (DA), Larry Krasner,
provides a particularly noteworthy example of this obstructionist dynamic.
Krasner, a former criminal defense and civil rights attorney, was elected
DA on a radical platform, explicitly designed to tackle mass incarceration
and issues of racial justice.48 As Krasner introduced new policies and
sought to prosecute officers who used excessive force, he frequently butted
heads with the union, which he described as “frankly racist and whitedominated.”49 In a particularly controversial move, Krasner’s office
established a “do-not-call list” of police officers: If officers had an extensive
history of misconduct, they would be placed on the list, alerting prosecutors that they would make risky witnesses (i.e., they might lie on the stand
or be impeached with their history of misconduct).50
The move to establish the list was framed not only in terms of ensuring
successful prosecutions, but also in terms of working toward greater transparency and accountability. The message was clear: The police were no
longer off limits from official criticism, and “bad apples” did not deserve
the sort of respect and deference that they previously had received.51
Philadelphia’s FOP responded swiftly and strongly by suing Krasner.52 As
one commentator argued, “Krasner’s tiny list [sixty-six out of 6,500
officers] actually supports the union’s claim that it’s just a handful of ‘bad
apples’ in law enforcement who are the problem. And yet the union is still
suing the city for trying to keep these apples from ‘spoiling’ their court
cases.”53 To union critics, then, the FOP was putting the interests of
testifying officers ahead of the public interest.
Krasner has not been alone in adopting this approach, as other
reformist DAs nationwide have sought to use do-not-call lists as a way of
racial violence that upholds the exploitation of Black communities in particular, as well as
other communities of color.”).
48. See, e.g., Maura Ewing, The Progressive Civil-Rights Lawyer Philadelphia Wants for
District Attorney, Atlantic (May 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/05/philadelphia-district-attorney-election-reform/526812 [https://perma.cc/984HB7SY]; Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, New
Yorker (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasnerscampaign-to-end-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/4Q5F-3NRR].
49. Gonnerman, supra note 48.
50. See Mensah M. Dean & Mark Fazlollah, FOP Sues Kenney, Krasner, Ross over
Police ‘Do-Not-Call’ List, Phila. Inquirer, http://www2.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/
fop-lawsuit-kenney-krasner-ross-police-do-not-call-list-philadelphia-20181113.html [https://
perma.cc/9HLA-E5C3] (last updated Nov. 13, 2018).
51. See Mark Fazlollah & Chris Palmer, Philly DA Larry Krasner Seeking to Develop
Comprehensive List of Tainted Cops, Phila. Inquirer (June 4, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/
philly/news/crime/philly-da-larry-krasner-seeking-to-develop-comprehensive-list-of-taintedcops-20180604.html [https://perma.cc/CN8J-AAYC].
52. See Dean & Fazlollah, supra note 50.
53. Scott Shackford, Philly Police Union Sues over Attempts to Keep Bad Cops off the
Stand, Reason (Nov. 21, 2018), https://reason.com/blog/2018/11/21/philly-police-unionsues-over-attempts-t [https://perma.cc/F93D-KGCR].
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signaling disapproval for police misconduct.54 Many (including police
leadership) view these lists as a second-best alternative necessitated by
union-backed protections.55 As Tucson, Arizona Police Chief Chris Magnus
puts it, “If I had my way, officers who lie wouldn’t just be put on a list,
they’d be ﬁred, and also not allowed to work in any other jurisdiction as a
police officer ever again . . . . But unfortunately, we have to allow them
back into the workplace [due to union contracts].”56
Whether through pushing for “law enforcement officers’ bills of
rights”57 at the legislative level or contractual provisions, unions act to shield
officers from public view and from accountability for alleged misconduct.58
If society recognizes that CBAs are a major component of policing regulation,59 this argument goes, then police unions become a primary force in

54. See Justin George & Eli Hager, One Way to Deal with Cops Who Lie? Blacklist
Them, Some DAs Say, Marshall Project (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2019/01/17/one-way-to-deal-with-cops-who-lie-blacklist-them-some-das-say [https://perma.cc/
GJJ9-JKR8]. This focus on “bad apples” is frequently critiqued as a means of legitimating
police practices and deﬂecting structural criticism. See Kristian Williams, Our Enemies in
Blue: Police and Power in America 23 (2015) [hereinafter Williams, Our Enemies in Blue]
(“This [‘Rotten Apple’ theory] is a handy tool for diverting attention away from the
institution, its structure, practices, and social role, pushing the blame, instead, onto some
few of its agents. It is, in other words, a means of protecting the organization from scrutiny
and of avoiding change.”). The distinction between individual bad actors and structural
defects carries particular signiﬁcance in the policing context, where civil rights suits must
assert a broader policy if the plaintiff wishes to obtain relief from the municipality, state, or
governmental entity. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
55. See George & Hager, supra note 54 (“Ronal Serpas, executive director of Law
Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime & Incarceration, . . . said a better solution than
blacklists would be for district attorneys to urge police leaders to implement ‘one and done’
policies. Such rules would require immediate ﬁring for any work-related lie.”).
56. Id. He goes on to note that “[i]t frustrates the hell out of me . . . that we have
employees receiving full pay but who can’t really function as full police officers.” Id.
57. These provisions—creatures of state statute—provide officers with procedural
rights, often relating to disciplinary investigations after uses of force. See, e.g., Kami Chavis
Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal
Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 489, 522
(2008).
58. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting
Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 307–08 (2017)
(discussing union-bargained-for restrictions on access to police disciplinary records); Robin
G. Steinberg, Police Power and the Scaring of America: A Personal Journey, 34 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. 131, 133 & n.7 (2015) (“Police unions are quick to speak out against any criticism
of police behavior, contributing to the ‘hero cop’ narrative of police who are under siege.”);
Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yale L.J. 1156,
1196 (1974) (describing “[d]emands by policemen for disciplinary procedures which
effectively foreclose use of a public review board”).
59. See Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing, supra note 12, at 2205–17
(arguing that union contracts are one of many non-court-created regulatory regimes that
structure contemporary policing); Dharmapala et al., supra note 12, at 30 (presenting
ﬁndings indicating that CBA terms affect rates of police violence); cf. John Rappaport,
Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 205, 212–18 (2015)
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the construction of policing and police accountability.60 Rather than
throwing up their hands at the capriciousness of courts, activists and academics adopting this critique come to see unions and the collective
bargaining process as a major lever of power, a lever that might become
the proper target for pressure to shift the rules and practices of law
enforcement.61
B.

The Political Critique

The second line of critique increasingly prevalent in the policing
literature focuses less on the structural impediments presented by unions
than on the public (or, perhaps, public relations) role of unions.62 Police
unions often represent a conservative or reactionary vision of the criminal
system and race relations in the United States.63 Where a range of politicians, scholars, and activists have expressed concern about the realities of

[hereinafter Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation] (distinguishing between “ﬁrst-order”
and “second-order” modes of regulating law enforcement).
60. In one particularly noteworthy report, investigative journalists for The Washington
Post showed that “[s]ince 2006, the nation’s largest police departments have ﬁred at least
1,881 officers for misconduct that betrayed the public’s trust, from cheating on overtime to
unjustiﬁed shootings. But . . . departments have been forced to reinstate more than 450
officers after appeals required by union contracts.” Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery & Steven
Rich, FIRED/REHIRED, Wash. Post (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2017/investigations/police-ﬁred-rehired (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
61. See, e.g., Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 Vill. L. Rev. 953, 997 (2017)
(calling for reforms that might come via CBAs); Rushin & Garnett, supra note 34, at 1226
(arguing that the federal government should “pressure[] municipalities to renegotiate”
problematic aspects of CBAs).
62. As one guide for police union leaders puts it, “[T]he media requires you use it or
it will use you . . . . Second to political involvement, dealing with the media is the next most
distasteful activity for almost all union officials . . . . The battle is always in the Court of
Public Opinion, and if you forget that, your union will get into trouble.” Ron DeLord & Ron
York, Law Enforcement, Police Unions, and the Future: Educating Police Management and
Unions About the Challenges Ahead 83 (2017) (emphasis omitted).
63. See, e.g., Williams, Our Enemies in Blue, supra note 54, at 77–177 (tracking the
rise of professionalized policing as inherently intertwined with social control of marginalized and less powerful groups); Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 745 (“Police unions
also actively opposed reform-oriented chiefs and civilian review boards, both for reasons of
conservative and sometimes racist ideology and to protect police officers’ bread-and-butter
interests, like pay, beneﬁts, and job security.”); Shawn Gude, The Bad Kind of Unionism,
Jacobin (Jan. 12, 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/01/the-bad-kind-of-unionism
[https://perma.cc/YJ7B-5HJ7] [hereinafter Gude, The Bad Kind of Unionism] (“The cop
who rallies for collective bargaining today will be protecting Goldman Sachs tomorrow.”);
Catherine S. Manegold, Rally Puts Police Under New Scrutiny, N.Y. Times (Sept. 27, 1992),
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/27/nyregion/rally-puts-police-under-new-scrutiny.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Officials with the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association,
which organized and promoted the rally . . . did [not] . . . appear to discourage protesters
from displaying obscene and inﬂammatory signs, like those depicting the Mayor with a large
Afro-style haircut and swollen lips or another making reference to Mr. Dinkins as a
‘washroom attendant.’”).
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modern policing,64 police unions have resisted and have been quick to
throw their weight behind politics and policies that appear to exacerbate
racial tensions and the likelihood of violence. Faced with public concern
about race and policing, the unions have given no quarter, adopting a
confrontational and, at times, threatening posture.65 Police unions, to
politically focused critics, represent a pernicious force, a force that should
be excluded from the labor movement and perhaps eliminated altogether.
In July 2015, the Black Interests Coordinating Committee, a subgroup
of United Auto Workers Local 2865, the union representing 13,000
University of California graduate instructors and student workers, passed
a resolution asking the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) to “end its affiliation” with the
International Union of Police Associations.66 The resolution situates police
unions ﬁrmly within a framework of white supremacy and institutionalized
subordination:
Historically and contemporarily, police unions serve the interests
of police forces as an arm of the state, and not the interests of
police as laborers. Instead, their “unionization” allows police to
masquerade as members of the working-class and obfuscates
their role in enforcing racism, capitalism, colonialism, and the
oppression of the working-class.67
According to the language of the open letter to the AFL-CIO, police
unions “channel resources towards upholding racist practices” in three
particular ways: (1) “[l]obbying to oppose independent oversight by civilians
and other governmental entities,” (2) “[c]ampaigning for political actors
64. See, e.g., Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 1
(2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q965-9X4N] (explaining that President Obama created the 21st Century Policing Task
Force because “of recent events that have exposed rifts in the relationships between local
police and the communities they protect and serve”).
65. See, e.g., Shawn Gude, Why We Can’t Support Police Unions, Jacobin (July 31,
2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/07/black-lives-matter-patrick-lynch-ferguson
[https://perma.cc/L2US-DLWV] [hereinafter Gude, Support Police Unions] (“Police
unions . . . have . . . behaved deplorably . . . . Ferguson[’s union] raised money online for
Michael Brown’s killer. Baltimore’s did the same for the officers charged in connection with
Freddie Gray’s death. And the Cleveland . . . Union raffled off a Glock as a fundraiser for
the cop accused of killing eighteen-year-old Brandon Jones.”); Editorial, Offensive Tweet
Shows Why St. Louis Police Officers Association Is Part of the Problem, St. Louis PostDispatch (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorialoffensive-tweet-shows-why-st-louis-police-officers-association/article_791eaa5b-1697-5b7a8727-3218b305ea4f.html [https://perma.cc/A57U-ZLJH] (“The clear signal was that police
officers should know who their enemies are. Take whatever action necessary. Don’t feel
terribly compelled to render quick assistance if these businesses call for help.”).
66. Mario Vasquez, Univ. of California Academic Workers’ Union Calls on AFLCIO to Terminate Police Union’s Membership, In These Times (July 27, 2015), http://
inthesetimes.com/working/entry/18240/afl-cio-police-unions-racism-black-lives-matter
[https://perma.cc/WP9P-MSEY].
67. Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 to AFL-CIO, supra note 47.
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who support limited police accountability,” and (3) “[d]efending officers’
crimes of racist brutality in court.”68 In this account, police are disassociated
from any status as labor,69 and the union simply becomes a tool to advance
a set of politically objectionable ends.70
To the extent that the expression of a collective voice is a generally
recognized union function,71 police unions take full advantage of this
function. “[P]olice unions have a strong voice at the state and local levels”
and are seen by critics as embodying a deeply problematic voice or
collective opinion.72 Indeed, U.S. police unions differ from police unions
in other countries in large part because of this political role or function.73
While “[t]he police forces in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom are unionized,” they “are generally restrained or prohibited
from being involved in election campaigns of individual candidates or
political parties.”74 That approach stands in marked contrast to the U.S.
model, where “the overwhelming majority of . . . police unions are politically
active in the campaigns of those persons elected to control the police
themselves.”75
Police unions’ role as “major players in the ‘Court of Public Opinion’”76
has become a ﬂashpoint as police accountability has become a matter of
greater public concern.77 In the wake of highly publicized deaths of black
68. Id.
69. But see id. (“Black lives are considered less important than job protection for
police.”).
70. Lurking here is or may be an important distinction between “workers” as an
imagined class of people and “labor” as an imagined subclass of workers. That is, perhaps
the claim in the above quote accepts police officers’ status as workers, but rejects their status
as labor. Presumably, labor, then, is conceived not in terms of class status, but class solidarity.
Or, perhaps “labor” excludes workers whose status and interests are too closely aligned with
those of management or capital. See infra sections III.B–.C.
71. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 163, 181 (explaining how unions have historically
united people under a collective voice); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the
Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1156–69 (1991) (“[L]abor
unions can be an effective, central tool in a feminist agenda targeting the gendered
structure of wage labor. Collective action is the most powerful and expedient route to female
empowerment; further, it is the only feasible means of transforming our deeply gendered
market and family structure.”); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossiﬁcation of American Labor
Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1527, 1556 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, The Ossiﬁcation of
American Labor Law] (noting how the prospect of tort liability might deter some employers
from suppressing the efforts of their employees to organize a collective voice).
72. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1827, 1879 (2015).
73. See Ron DeLord, John Burpo, Michael Shannon & Jim Spearing, Police Union
Power, Politics, and Confrontation in the 21st Century: New Challenges, New Issues
239–40 (2d ed. 2008).
74. Id. at 239.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 240.
77. See, e.g., Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism, 126 Yale L.J.
2222, 2224 (2017) (describing an “intense focus on policing in America,” precipitated by
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civilians at the hands of police, union leaders were quick not only to stand
up for the officers involved but also to affirmatively reject any stated concerns
about police violence, police–civilian interactions, or race relations.78 That
is, the voice or, more crassly, the “public relations” function of police
unions tends to reﬂect a hard line—either endorsing unreconstructed
tough-on-crime responses to debates about criminal justice policy or
ignoring concerns outright.79
As one glaring example, take the union response to the killing of
Tamir Rice.80 On November 22, 2014, Cleveland police received a dispatch
call about a black male with a “probably fake” gun sitting on a swing at a
neighborhood park.81 Two officers responded to the call and arrived at the
park.82 Within seconds, rookie officer Timothy Loehmann ﬁred two shots
at the black male—twelve-year-old Tamir Rice.83 As in a number of other
high-proﬁle police shootings, a Cuyahoga County grand jury declined to
indict Loehmann.84 But the city of Cleveland ultimately reached a $6
million civil settlement with Rice’s family.85
Public outcry in the wake of Rice’s shooting came fast and furiously.86
The fall of 2014 saw growing attention paid to police violence and the use
publicized killings of civilians of color); Samuel Walker, “Not Dead Yet”: The National
Police Crisis, a New Conversation About Policing, and the Prospects for AccountabilityRelated Police Reform, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1777, 1784–90 (describing the “national police
crisis”).
78. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 12, at 48–50.
79. See Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke & Brian Roberts,
Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order 38–39 (1978) (discussing
the role of police in shaping public narrative).
80. Police union leaders frequently take similar approaches in police shooting cases,
adopting an aggressive stance in the media as defenders of the officers involved. See
McCormick, supra note 12, at 47–48 (discussing the union response to the Michael Brown
shooting).
81. See Cory Shaffer, Cleveland Police Officer Shoots 12-year-old Boy Carrying BB
Gun, Cleveland.com (Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/
11/cleveland_police_officer_shoot_6.html [https://perma.cc/2HK5-NK5C]; see also Tom
McCarthy, Tamir Rice: Video Shows Boy, 12, Shot ‘Seconds’ After Police Confronted Child,
Guardian (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/26/tamirrice-video-shows-boy-shot-police-cleveland [https://perma.cc/FRQ4-S2NP].
82. See Shaffer, supra note 81.
83. See McCarthy, supra note 81; Shaffer, supra note 81.
84. See Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in
Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
85. See Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, Cleveland Agrees to Pay $6 Million to Settle
Tamir Rice Lawsuit, Won’t Admit Any Wrongdoing, Wash. Post (Apr. 25, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/04/25/cleveland-agrees-to-pay-6million-to-settle-tamir-rice-lawsuit/?utm_term=.ffc5d5697b35 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
86. See Bryan Adamson, Reconsidering Pre-Indictment Publicity: Racialized Crime
News, Grand Juries and Tamir Rice, 8 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 1, 9 nn.41–43 (2017)
(collecting sources).
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of lethal force against people of color, particularly black men.87 Cell phone
videos showing deadly police confrontations went viral on social media,
and protesters rallied around the slogan “Black Lives Matter.”88 Rice’s death
added fuel to the ﬁre, feeding the perception that police were too quick
to resort to deadly force in confrontations with black civilians.89 As with
the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the failure to indict the
shooting officer led to even greater outrage.90 At the same time, Cleveland’s
police union (like unions in other police shootings) stood behind Loehmann
and offered strong support for the officers involved.91
There’s nothing remarkable about the fact that the union here would
support its member.92 As I argue in Part II, that is a core function of unions.
More noteworthy is the Cleveland Police Patrolman Association’s aggressive approach once the family settled its suit.93 Rather than remaining silent,
issuing a carefully worded release about loss of life, or even taking the
opportunity to remind the public that no officer had been charged with a
crime, the union went on the offensive. In an open letter to the media,
union president Stephen Loomis wrote: “[W]e can only hope that the Rice
family and their attorneys will use a portion of this settlement to help
educate the youth of Cleveland in the dangers associated with the
mishandling of both real and facsimile ﬁrearms.”94 Faced with widespread
public outrage, the union had doubled down by implying once again that
Rice’s death was his own fault and that his family, not the police, had work
to do going forward. The Patrolman’s Association, in this account, wasn’t
simply being obstructionist by shielding Loehmann from accountability. It
also was using its power to operate as a public vehicle for a set of defensive,
hostile sentiments.
87. See, e.g., Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1794, 1794–96
(2015); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”:
Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 23, 24
(2014); Adamson, supra note 86, at 9 nn.41–43.
88. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 393–94
(2016) (discussing the phenomenon of organized copwatching by local communities as a
means to hold police departments accountable).
89. See Williams & Smith, supra note 84.
90. See generally Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 Geo. L.J. 745 (2016)
[hereinafter Levine, How We Prosecute] (describing responses to grand jury decisions in
officer shooting cases).
91. See Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Settlement Should Help Educate Kids on Guns, Cleveland
Police Union President Says, Cleveland.com (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.cleveland.com/
court-justice/index.ssf/2016/04/tamir_rice_settlement_should_h.html [https://perma.cc/
YCZ8-NFEC] (last updated Jan. 11, 2019).
92. Why Is This Happening? With Chris Hayes: Ending Mass Incarceration with Larry
Krasner, NBC News: Think (Jul. 10, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/howprosecutors-can-help-end-mass-incarceration-larry-krasner-podcast-ncna890126 [https://
perma.cc/422E-M2WU] (“[T]he job of a union head to some extent is to avoid
accountability on the part of its members.”).
93. See Heisig, supra note 91.
94. Id.

2020]

POLICE UNIONS

1351

A look at the official social media accounts of many police unions
reveals a similar approach. When Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez released an
adverse credibility list in November 2019 (similar to the list released by
Krasner, discussed above),95 New York City Police Benevolent Association
President Patrick Lynch released a statement decrying Gonzalez as a
traitor to his role in law enforcement:
It is clear that . . . Gonzalez has abandoned his prosecutorial role.
He sides with the criminals, not crime victims. He knows that
truthful police testimony gets thrown out every day in our courts,
often based on a judge’s whims and biases. He knows that
publicizing this information will destroy the careers of honest
police officers and torpedo the cases against violent, gun-toting
criminals—assuming his office bothers to prosecute them at all.
He could have and should have fought the request to release
these records. He chose not to do so. In northern Brooklyn
alone, 218 people have been shot this year, an 11.2% increase
over last year. If the victims and their families want someone to
answer for this violence, they should head to Gonzalez’s office.
They might well ﬁnd an “out of business” sign on the door.96
As framed by the union, challenging police violence or misconduct is
tantamount to abetting “gun-toting criminals.” And providing oversight is
implicitly linked to violent crime rates. The voice of the union, then, is one
that brooks no compromise and is open to no critique. It is that voice or
role that has so riled many scholars and activists.
“Law enforcement unions,” one commentator argues, “are not simply
barriers to criminal justice reform and decarceration because of economic
concerns for their members . . . . [T]heir commitment is not only to mass
incarceration as a job provider, but to the system of racist oppression and
unjust societal organization that these jobs uphold.”97 In this account,
white supremacy and the violent suppression of marginalized populations
is not an unintended byproduct of police unions’ political positions.98
Rather, there is some core structural ﬂaw with police unions that makes

95. See Joseph Goldstein, Why 7 Police Officers Were Blacklisted in Brooklyn, N.Y.
Times (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/nyregion/police-credibilitybrooklyn-district-attorney.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); supra notes 48–54
and accompanying text.
96. The Police Benevolent Association of N.Y.C. (@NYCPBA), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://twitter.com/NYCPBA/status/1192217524550717440 [https://perma.cc/94ZW-YDEA].
97. Natasha Lennard, Police Unions’ Opposition to Prison Reform Is About More
Than Jobs—It’s About Racism, Intercept (Aug. 14, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/
08/14/police-unions-prison-reform [https://perma.cc/DB75-GX4Z].
98. See Vasquez, supra note 66 (“Police unions in particular emerge out of a long
history of police intervention in labor politics and its complicity in racial violence . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865
to AFL-CIO, supra note 47)).
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them direct defenders or proponents of a particular brand of policing that
is inextricably linked to a history of racial subordination.99
Perhaps the biggest target for this line of critique has been the FOP.
As police–civilian tensions have attracted increasing attention, the FOP
(both on the national level and among locals) has taken a hard line—
actively opposing reformist initiatives and vocally supporting politicians
and policies hostile to criminal justice reform and racial justice.100 Particularly notable has been the FOP’s warm relationship with Donald Trump,
both in the lead-up to his election and once he took office.101 The union’s
decision to endorse then-candidate Trump was hardly an anomaly—police
unions play an active role in the political sphere, and police union
endorsements have played signiﬁcant roles in recent elections.102 But the
decision, coupled with the fraught racial politics of the election, did not
go unnoticed, generating even greater outrage from police union critics.103

99. Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project,
111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1597, 1604–05 (2017) (“[Criminal legal] institutions enforce an
undemocratic racial caste system originating in slavery.”). It is not unreasonable to read
these critiques as fundamentally claims about police or policing, rather than police unions.
That said, commentators have chosen to identify the unions, rather than the police
themselves, as the inheritors of a speciﬁc white supremacist and hierarchical agenda. And,
I think that choice matters. See infra section IV.B.
100. See, e.g., Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 11; Letter from Chuck
Canterbury, Nat’l President, Nat’l Fraternal Order of Police, to Donald J. Trump, President,
U.S. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://fop.net/CmsDocument/Doc/POTUS%20on%20S.%201917%20sentencing.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (urging the President to oppose
the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act). But see Press Release, Nat’l Fraternal Order
of Police, FOP Partners with President Trump on Criminal Justice Reform (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://fop.net/CmsDocument/Doc/FOP%20on%20First%20Step%20Act.pdf (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (announcing support for the First Step Act and the risk
assessment tools and sentencing reforms it establishes).
101. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Fraternal Order of Police, Fraternal Order of Police
Endorses Trump!!! (Sept. 16, 2016), https://fop.net/CmsDocument/Doc/pr_2016-0916.pdf
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also, e.g., Nathalie Baptiste, Here’s What the
Biggest Police Union Wants from Trump, Mother Jones (Dec. 13, 2016), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/heres-what-biggest-police-union-wants-trump-hisﬁrst-100-days [https://perma.cc/X6CC-B636]; Tom Jackman, Fraternal Order of Police
Union Endorses Trump, Wash. Post (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
true-crime/wp/2016/09/16/fraternal-order-of-police-union-endorses-trump/?utm_term
=.d8c22265f2b0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting a union leader as stating
that Trump “made commitments to us that he would support law enforcement if he was
elected, and keep our views in mind as he undertook to uphold the threshold responsibility
of a president, which is to protect public safety”).
102. See Michael Zoorob, Blue Endorsements Matter: How the Fraternal Order of
Police Contributed to Donald Trump’s Victory, 52 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 243, 247–49 (2019)
(“For Trump in 2016, blue endorsements mattered precisely because police are so widely
organized across communities. When hundreds of thousands of men and women in blue
proclaimed Trump their candidate, many other Americans got the message.”).
103. See Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 11.
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In one particularly striking op-ed, policing scholar Paul Butler argues
that it is time to abolish the FOP.104 While Butler recognizes a range of
legal impediments to this proposal, he contends that the organization has
come to operate as an organ of white supremacy.105 According to Butler,
the FOP “consistently take[s] stances against the safety and rights of black
Americans. As a result, the organization serves as a union cum fraternity
for white cops and has a retrograde effect on policing, especially as it
relates to civil rights.”106 In this rendering, the union operates as a vehicle
for politically reactionary goals. Where reformers seek to improve police–
civilian relations or to advance goals of racial justice, the FOP operates as
a vehicle of white supremacy.107 As Butler puts it, “The FOP, as currently
constituted, should be relegated to the same historical dustbin as
organizations like the Sons of the Confederacy and the White Citizens
Council.”108 And, indeed, other scholars have traced modern policing to
British colonial practices designed to “manag[e] disorder and protect[]
the propertied classes from the rabble.”109
To Butler and those other critics, police unions operate as a means of
reinforcing and consolidating police power. Historically, police have
served as “protectors of privilege,” and—according to critics—police

104. See id. Other critics of police unions do not necessarily call for their complete
eradication. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 61, at 997 (“I certainly do not call for the abolition
of police unions . . . .”); Katherine J. Bies, Note, Let the Sunshine In: Illuminating the
Powerful Role Police Unions Play in Shielding Officer Misconduct, 28 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev.
109, 112–13 (2017) (“These criticisms do not call for the elimination of police unions.”).
105. See Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 11.
106. Id.
107. Different reformers have very different goals. On the one hand, advocates of
procedural justice may prioritize police relationships with the communities they patrol. See,
e.g., Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 Yale
L.J. 2054, 2073, 2081–83 (2017) (describing and critiquing this position); Tracey L.
Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing and
Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1865, 1875–79, 1879 ﬁg.1
(2013) (discussing “rightful policing,” the extent to which people defer to police authority,
and how that impacts procedural justice); Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance:
Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016 U. Chi. Legal Forum 295, 352–53
(describing and critiquing procedural justice as overly focused on obedience). On the other
hand, police abolitionists and other more radical commentators may seek to advance
substantive ends often at odds with any (or at least the contemporary) vision of policing.
See generally Alex S. Vitale, The End of Policing 29 (2017) [hereinafter Vitale, The End
of Policing] (“Any real agenda for police reform must replace police with empowered
communities working to solve their own problems.”); Derecka Purnell, What Does Police
Abolition Mean?, Bos. Rev. (Aug. 23, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/dereckapurnell-what-does-police-abolition-mean [https://perma.cc/D87J-NWEG] (arguing that
reforms “will not save” law enforcement that “arbitrarily enforces laws according to
demographics and maintains order according to each officer’s subjective notion of peace”).
108. Butler, The Fraternal Order of Police, supra note 11.
109. Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 35.
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unions serve as the unreconstructed voice of that regressive impulse.110 If
we accept the critiques of criminal policy as reinforcing white supremacy,111 and of expansive police power as extending the governance model
of the Jim Crow South,112 then it’s not hard to see why police unions would
be deeply objectionable.113
Having laid out these two primary lines of critique, the next Part seeks
to resituate police unions within the literature on public-sector unions. In
doing so, I hope to highlight the limitations of viewing police unions only
through the lens of criminal law.
II. POLICE UNIONS AS UNIONS
As a descriptive matter, the critiques outlined in the previous Part are
fair as far as they go. Police unions have served as a signiﬁcant impediment
to many reformist and transformative efforts. Police unions have stood
behind many officers accused of violence and racism. And police unions
have undoubtedly taken political positions that might trouble many critics
and commentators on the left (broadly conceived). But, as I argue in this
Part, these critiques can’t and shouldn’t be divorced from longstanding
critiques of other public-sector unions. The legal academic literature on
police unions has focused largely on the policing aspect, rather than the
union aspect, of police unions.114 Most scholarly attention has come from
the world of criminal justice scholars, rather than academics focused on

110. See generally Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police
Repression in Urban America (1990) (examining the history of repressive police
practices in U.S. cities).
111. See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Colorblindness (2012 ed. 2010) (arguing that criminal policies have created a
new “racial caste system” in the United States); Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way
It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419, 1425 (2016)
[hereinafter Butler, The System Is Working] (arguing that the problems identiﬁed by critics
of discriminatory policing are actually “integral features of policing and punishment in the
United States”); 13th (Kandoo Films 2016) (documenting the impact of mass
incarceration).
112. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of
Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 775, 788 (1999) (tracing the
roots of contemporary antiloitering statutes to Black Codes passed in southern states
following the Civil War); Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 to AFL-CIO, supra
note 47 (“The modern U.S. institution of the police has roots in the repressive demands of
powerful white capitalists. Overseers and slave patrols in the South evolved alongside the
growing need to maintain ‘order’ in early urban areas in the North.”).
113. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114. See Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 28, at 180–93 (examining the
role of police unions in giving rank-and-ﬁle officers greater say in how policing is carried
out); McCormick, supra note 12, at 51–53 (“While there has been signiﬁcant study of the
use of force by police officers, there has been virtually no study of police unions.”). But see
generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12 (proposing structural reforms to police union
representation to help enable policy reforms).
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labor law.115 In these accounts, police unions are treated as a feature of the
criminal legal landscape and players in the design of criminal policy but
not necessarily a major player in the design of contemporary labor
markets. To the extent that labor law has a role to play, it is in better understanding police;116 historically, scholars have not treated police unions as
a vehicle or case study for better understanding labor law or the labor
movement.117
Such a criminal law-centric account provides a useful corrective to
traditional, court-focused criminal justice scholarship,118 recognizing that
the “law on the ground” relies on a range of different sources and
actors.119 Yet, even this realist approach often suffers from a broader
pathology of criminal law scholarship (and legal scholarship generally):120
the tendency to silo or exceptionalize criminal law.121 Additionally, this
115. But see generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12 (exploring “how public sector
law might be changed . . . to support reforms” within police departments); McCormick,
supra note 12 (applying labor law concepts to critique police unions).
116. See generally Rushin & Garnett, supra note 34 (analyzing the relationship between
state labor law and federal efforts to regulate police); Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of
Policing, supra note 12, at 2205–17 (providing a detailed discussion of the importance of
CBAs in regulating policing and shaping departmental culture).
117. In their discussion of state labor law’s interaction with structural litigation by the
DOJ, Rushin and Garnett do note that similar dynamics might be at play in other public
sector union contexts. Rushin & Garnett, supra note 34, at 1227; see also Fisk & Richardson,
supra note 12, at 716.
118. See supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text; see also Aziz Z. Huq, Fourth
Amendment Gloss, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 701, 742–53 (2019) (describing police unions’ role
in shaping police practices); cf. Pierre Schlag, The Empty Circles of Liberal Justiﬁcation, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1997) (“The Constitution is, in American popular and legal culture, an
authoritative paramount norm—hierarchically superior to any other legal or political
authority . . . .”).
119. Issa Kohler-Hausman, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational
Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking,
supra note 26, at 246, 246–47 (arguing that “the law” is the law in action, not the law on the
books).
120. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The
Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 Yale L.J. 616, 622 (2019)
[hereinafter Andrias, An American Approach] (critiquing the labor–employment law
divide); Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law,
28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 163, 165–66 (2007) (critiquing the distinction among labor
law, employment law, and employment discrimination as failing to paint an accurate picture
of the laws that govern the workplace); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law
Exceptionalism, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 753, 756 (2010) (noting that the very existence of
“family law” as a distinct category in the social and legal order produces ideological and
political meaning and does “concrete distributional work”); Janet Halley, What Is Family
Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 5 (2011) (critiquing the move to
exceptionalize “family law” as a distinct area of study).
121. See Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of ‘Criminal Justice’, 15 Ohio St.
J. Crim. L. 619, 633 (2018) (“Put simply, the siloing of legal areas is a major obstacle to a
necessarily holistic and sweeping critique, not to mention a more expansive vision of what
reform could look like.”).
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approach plays into a broader narrative in which police unions are clearly
distinguishable from any other corner of organized labor. “Police unions,”
some labor leaders suggest, “are the duck-billed platypus of the labor
movement.”122
In one of the rare, and critically important, labor-centric accounts of
police unions, labor law scholar Catherine Fisk and policing scholar Song
Richardson stress a different frame for studying law enforcement.123 “The
debates over police unions are part of a larger legal and policy debate over
whether public employee unions are agents of or obstacles to government
reform.”124 This frame for discussing police unions is critically important
“because local government employees (including police) are among the
most densely unionized in the country.”125 Questions of policing are
inherently questions of governance, which in turn rely on understanding
how power and decisionmaking authority are allocated at the governmental level.126 Conversations about policing and police unions, viewed in this
light, are inherently conversations about governance, but also about work.
This Part ﬁrst provides a brief overview of the law governing police
unions and police unions’ relationship to common theoretical justiﬁcations for unionization. While I don’t aim to provide an exhaustive account
of state public-sector labor law, it is useful to recognize the legal
architecture that underpins police unions’ power. Or, at the very least, it
is worth recognizing what aspects of police unions are common features
of other unions. Next, this Part describes the potential parallels between
the critiques traced in Part I and the discourse surrounding other publicsector unions. Ultimately, I argue, despite some obvious legal and
structural differences between the relevant unions and labor markets,
police union critiques sound an awful lot like critiques leveled at other
public-sector organizing.

122. DeLord & York, supra note 62, at 11. DeLord and York go on to argue that—
despite police unions’ ostensible similarity to other unions—organized officers are “the
square peg in a round hole.” Id.
123. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 716.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the
Foundations of American Government 66 (2005) (describing the U.S. embrace of police
as a “mode of governance”); David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social
Order in Contemporary Society 114 (2001) (describing shifts in modes of policing
minority communities); Trevor George Gardner, Immigrant Sanctuary as the “Old
Normal”: A Brief History of Police Federalism, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2019) (“The
criminal literature . . . tends to situate police federalism in a binary schematic: The federal
government directs federal law enforcement . . . while the states hold authority over state
police . . . despite conveying most of their authority over municipal police to the respective
internal municipalities.”).
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Police Unions

“Police unions on the surface look like every other labor union,”
observe police labor advocates Ron DeLord and Ron York.127 Police unions
“organize around mutual protection, improving wages, beneﬁts and
working conditions, gaining collective bargaining rights and obtaining
professional standards.”128 When it comes to state labor law, police unions
often look quite similar to other public-sector unions. Five states—
Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee—
explicitly forbid police from bargaining collectively.129 But those same
states also forbid public school teachers and (with the exception of
Georgia) ﬁreﬁghters from bargaining collectively.130 Similarly, forty-eight
states treat police and teachers the same when it comes to the legality of
collective wage negotiation.131 There are exceptions: Texas, for example,
forbids public-sector workers from bargaining collectively, but makes an
exception for police officers.132
More importantly, though, in a number of recent, high-proﬁle efforts
to strip public-sector unions of legal protections, police unions (along with
other ﬁrst responders) have been excepted.133 For example, when
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker drew national attention for seeking to
balance the state’s budget by chipping away at public pensions and publicsector unions, police were treated differently.134 Labor law scholars
generally view the differential treatment of police unions as reﬂecting a
political calculus rooted in the voting patterns of union members.135
127. DeLord & York, supra note 62, at 11.
128. Id.
129. See Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Regulation of
Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the States 5 (2014), http://cepr.net/documents/
state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM53-2TXN] (collecting statutes).
130. See id. (collecting statutes).
131. See id. at 7.
132. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 174.002 (2019); Sanes & Schmitt, supra note 129, at 4.
133. See William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72
Ohio St. L.J. 1115, 1140 n.98 (2011) [hereinafter Forbath, Distributive Constitution]
(“[M]ost of the laws exempt some powerful public sector unions—police and ﬁreﬁghters—
from the stripping away of collective bargaining rights.”).
134. See Karen Kasler, Union Changes Make Headway in Ohio, NPR (Mar. 7, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/03/07/134331339/union-changes-make-headway-in-ohio?
utm_source [https://perma.cc/8AGQ-32TV]; Noam Scheiber, Public Pension Cuts Exempt
Police and Fireﬁghters, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
03/20/business/economy/police-officers-and-firefighters-are-exceptions-to-new-publicsector-rules.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that while Governor Scott
exempted police officers and ﬁreﬁghters from a bill that would roll back collective
bargaining rights, Governor John Kasich of Ohio did not exempt public safety employees
and “saw his efforts undone by voters in a referendum within eight months”).
135. See, e.g., Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1140; Kasler, supra
note 134 (noting that Governor Kasich’s anti-state-workers-union bill may have been
designed to affect employees such as teachers whose union supported Kasich’s opponent
and campaigned against him).
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William Forbath has argued that “today’s anti-public-sector-collectivebargaining laws . . . are designed to enfeeble public sector unionism not
for the asserted rationale of relieving the budget crises, but for the purpose
of depriving progressive lawmakers and progressive legislation of powerful
support.”136 And perhaps lending credence to this argument, in states
where police unions were not singled out from other public-sector unions,
Republican politicians were much more hesitant to back anti-union
bills.137
Outside of these political calculations, though, the most signiﬁcant
legal difference between the treatment of police unions and other publicsector unions has to do with the right to strike. Public-sector unions
generally face many more restrictions on striking than their private-sector
analogs.138 But the most dramatic restrictions tend to affect police and
other public employees treated as “essential to public safety.”139 Indeed,
despite contemporary support from conservative and otherwise-anti-union
politicians, organizing police officers historically have been met with opposition because of fears that they might strike, leading to lawlessness and
crime spikes.140 That is, the specter of striking—a major concern for any
public-sector unionization project or union activity that touches the
“public interest”—remains an animating feature of the legal architecture
of police unions.141
These state laws cannot begin to tell the entire story of police unions
and their legal, social, and political standing. But they provide some

136. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1140.
137. See Kasler, supra note 134 (quoting law professor Benjamin Sachs as noting that
“[t]he opposition that we’re seeing among the Republican Party in Ohio, which we’re not
seeing in Wisconsin, may well have to do with the fact that police and ﬁre are not exempted
in Ohio and are in Wisconsin” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. See, e.g., Potts v. Hay, 318 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Ark. 1958) (“[E]very judicial decision
on the subject holds that there is no right to strike against the government.”); Cty. Sanitation
Dist. No. 2 v. L.A. Cty. Emps. Ass’n, Local 660, 699 P.2d 835, 838 (Cal. 1985) (“A strike by
employees of the United States government may still be treated as a crime, and strikes by
state and local employees have been explicitly allowed by courts or statute in only 11 states.”
(footnote omitted)).
139. See Sanes & Schmitt, supra note 129, at 34–35 (collecting statutes).
140. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 735 (“[B]usiness and anti-labor groups
feared that unionized police would strike and, more important, would not stop other
employees from striking and picketing.”).
141. See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of
Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 222 (1993) (describing a “10-year no-strike commitment” in
a labor agreement governing a public construction project); Metro. Milwaukee Ass’n of
Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The County does not
require its contractors to negotiate no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements
with their unionized workers, common as such clauses are.”); David M. Rabban, Can
American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99
Yale L.J. 689, 718–19 (1990) (discussing evidence suggesting that the costs of strikes by
public employees may be exaggerated).
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scaffolding for a more nuanced discussion of police labor.142 Perhaps more
important, though, are some general governing principles that relate to
all labor unions, including police unions—most notably, the duty of fair
representation. In the private sector, the duty of fair representation was
ﬁrst articulated by the Supreme Court in two 1944 cases, Steele v. Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Co.143 and Wallace Corp. v. NLRB.144 The cases, both
decided on December 18, 1944, “established the principle that a union
must protect the interests of all workers in the bargaining unit it
represented regardless of union membership.”145 Both cases involved a
disfavored subset of the workers—either a racial or political minority.146
And, in both cases, the Court concluded that the union could not penalize
dissidents and must continue to represent all the workers in the bargaining
unit.147 This duty extends to public-sector unions.148
While accounts of police unions focused on policing policy emphasize
the unions’ obstructionist tendencies,149 it’s important to recognize that
the “obstruction” at the heart of the critiques is central to the function of
unions. That is, the duty of fair representation speaks the language of
obstruction—it is the union’s job to represent and protect the rights of its
members.150 Unions provide friction in the workplace, operating as a
barrier to employers who might otherwise run roughshod over workers in
an attempt to maximize proﬁts. In their inﬂuential economic analysis,
What Do Unions Do?, Richard Freeman and James Medoff argue that unions
have two roles or “faces” in society and in the workplace: the “monopoly

142. For more on state labor law and its relationship to police unions, see Rushin &
Garnett, supra note 34, at 1217–37 (describing how state labor laws can complicate federal
intervention in local police practices).
143. 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944).
144. 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944).
145. Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law,
Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 24 (1999).
146. See id. at 41–42 (discussing the cases).
147. See id.
148. See Jack R. Clary, Joel A. D’Alba & Parker Denaco, State and Local Government
Bargaining, 5 Lab. L. 434, 463 (1989) (“In states with public sector unions, [the duty of fair
representation] has been imposed by state statutes, administrative regulations or case law
that have been liberally inﬂuenced by their federal antecedents.”).
149. See supra Part I.
150. The duty in the police context (as in other contexts) certainly is not absolute. See,
e.g., Casanova v. City of Chicago, 793 N.E.2d 907, 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he Union
did not breach its duty of fair representation to Casanova when it declined to bring a
challenge to the arbitral award in the circuit court.”); Ramsey v. City of Pontiac, 417 N.W.2d
489, 494 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the duty of fair representation did not require
the union to investigate an officer’s claim, which clearly violated the bargaining agreement);
Tchida v. Police Officers’ Fed’n of Minneapolis, 375 N.W.2d 856, 858–59 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that “the duty of fair representation applies only to matters where the union
serves as the exclusive representative,” not to disciplinary hearings in which the officer has
other representation).
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face” and the “collective voice/institutional response face.”151 The monopoly face (a clear analog to the obstructionist role so heavily critiqued in the
policing context) is described as the union’s ability to bargain collectively
and to raise wages for workers.152 Unions, according to this classic account,
serve a critical role in aggregating worker power and preference:153 “At
their best, unions use [their] power to bring to the workplace not only
improved wages and working conditions but also a level of industrial
democracy and human dignity that is impossible to measure in dollars and
cents.”154
To many scholars, these functions or structural beneﬁts extend well
beyond the conﬁnes of the workplace.155 If we accept this view of worker
collective action as constitutive both of individual identity and solidarity or
group identity,156 then the two functions identified by Freeman and Medoff
operate in tandem as essential components of strengthening an engaged
polity. Unions provide power to individual workers by both standing as an
obstacle to employer power and giving voice to the worker as a political
and social agent.157
The two critiques articulated in Part I neatly map onto the two
generally recognized functions of the union: to protect its members’
interests and to advance broader politics, policies, or political goals that its

151. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 5–6, 13 (1984).
While hugely inﬂuential in the literature, the two faces identiﬁed by Freeman and Medoff
certainly are not the only functions that unions serve. That said, other accounts of unions’
functions tend to sound in similar registers. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 Yale L.J. 1107,
1112–13 (1969) (focusing on unions’ role in providing monopoly bargaining power and
individual political representation in the context of industrial democracy).
152. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 151, at 5–6, 13.
153. Id. at 10.
154. Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor’s House: Institutional Reform Litigation in
the Labor Movement, 1989 Duke L.J. 903, 915.
155. See Cyntha Estlund, Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a
Diverse Democracy 177 (2003) (“‘Reciprocal action’ through collective activity [in the
workplace] not only fosters particular relationships and usable ties but also more diffuse
and generalized feelings of empathy and understanding, of connectedness and being-inthis-togetherness among citizens.”).
156. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 313, 363 (2012) [hereinafter Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law] (“[W]orkers’
collective action is neither aberrational nor a threat to workers’ autonomy—rather, it is
partially constitutive of workers’ autonomy . . . .”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and
the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 73, 84 (1988) (“To the extent that the unfair labor practices can thus be understood
as protecting formation of an autonomous group identity, they comprise the constitutive
aspect of the [National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)].”).
157. Cf. Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive
Sociology 14 (1992) (“Classes and other antagonistic social collectives are continually
engaged in a struggle to impose the deﬁnition of the world that is most congruent with their
particular interests.”).
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members support.158 As Part IV outlines, opposition to police unions might
demonstrate the false promise (or, at least, the narrow scope) of these two
union functions. But the core recognized roles of unions are to protect
workers from their bosses and to serve as political advocates for their
members. Police union critics have identiﬁed those functions and they
have framed those functions as fundamentally objectionable.159
B.

Other Unpopular Unions

One of the primary goals of this Essay is to stress the ways in which
common critiques of police unions sound uncomfortably like anti-union
arguments in other sectors.160 This section identifies those parallels. Despite
their strength relative to private-sector unions,161 public-sector unions have
been under increasing attack over the course of the past decade.162 States
have passed “right to work” laws that prevent unions from requiring that
all represented workers pay dues.163 Union opponents have pursued a
range of creative litigation strategies geared at diminishing the power of
public-sector unions.164 Many of these attacks have come from the political

158. Some scholars have offered a slightly different account of police unions’ functions:
“Police unions also have two functions of speciﬁc signiﬁcance, on working conditions and
on discipline cases. It is the second function that places the police unions apart from
conventional unions.” Jan Berry, Greg O’Connor, Maurice Punch & Paul Wilson, Strange
Union: Changing Patterns of Reform, Representation, and Unionization in Policing, 9
Police Prac. & Res. 113, 114 (2008).
159. See supra Part I.
160. Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association
Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1023, 1076 (2013) (“Left-wing
critics of police and prison guards’ unions criticize these unions’ support for punitive
incarceration policies, just as right-wing critics of teachers’ unions blame them for the
failures of the public schools.”).
161. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1140 (“While private sector
union density has plummeted, public sector unionism has grown—to roughly 40% of the
public workforce.”).
162. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Public Unions Under First Amendment Fire, 95 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 1291, 1292–93 (2018).
163. See Courtlyn G. Roser-Jones, Reconciling Agency Fee Doctrine, the First
Amendment, and the Modern Public Sector Union, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 597, 635 (2018)
(“Aside from ‘right to work’ states, which prohibit all agency fee agreements in both the
private and public sectors, states have limited agency fee rights and their inﬂuence on
political activity through a variety of other statutory forms.”); Right to Work States, Nat’l
Right to Work Legal Def. Found., http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states [https://
perma.cc/M8JK-EX4D] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (collecting state statutes).
164. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2461 (2018) (“[Petitioner] Janus refused to join the Union because he opposes ‘many
of the public policies that [it] advocates,’ including the positions it takes in collective
bargaining.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at
18a, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-466))); Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S.
Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
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right.165 Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, Ohio Governor John Kasich,
and a range of other Republican politicians pushed “right to work” laws
and other regulations that they identiﬁed as both addressing state budget
crises and protecting the rights of anti-union workers.166
These recent moves are far from unprecedented. “Civil service reform”
and ﬁghts between public-sector employers and their workers have
recurred historically as deﬁning features of public discourse regarding
unions and their social function.167 The specter of highly compensated or
powerful workers thwarting the public interest has long made publicsector unions both controversial and distinct from private-sector unions.
As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt argued in a 1937 letter, “A strike
of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to
obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisﬁed.
Such action, looking toward the paralysis of government by those who have
sworn to support it is unthinkable and intolerable.”168 To what extent
Roosevelt actually opposed public-sector organizing remains a point of
historical debate,169 but skepticism about public-sector unions has remained
widespread.170 Given that “[p]ublic sector unionism had become the
vibrant component of the American labor movement,”171 this skepticism
takes on a major role in the discourse surrounding contemporary labor
policy.

165. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1079
(2014) (describing “a burgeoning Republican ‘right to work’ movement”).
166. See, e.g., Patrick Marley, State Workers Willing to Bend on Concessions, Not
Bargaining Rights, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Feb. 14, 2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/
news/statepolitics/116162704.html [https://perma.cc/2AP8-9G42]; Jim Provance, Gov.
Kasich Delivers Statehouse Speech to Lawmakers, Hecklers, Blade (Mar. 8, 2011), available
at 2011 WLNR 4535449 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
167. See, e.g., Joseph E. Slater, Public Workers: Government Employee Unions, the
Law, and the State, 1900–1962, at 17 (2004).
168. Isadore Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employee?, 1 Lab. L.J. 604,
612 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt
to L.C. Stewart, President, Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 16, 1937)).
169. Fischl, Running the Government, supra note 23, at 65 (“As I read the letter,
Roosevelt is indeed quite clear about his opposition to strikes by public employees, but his
position on collective bargaining seems to me to be more nuanced than the sound-bite
version suggests.”).
170. See, e.g., Joseph A. McCartin, Unexpected Convergence: Values, Assumptions, and
the Right to Strike in Public and Private Sectors, 1945–2005, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 727, 733
(2009) (“In the immediate aftermath of World War II there was no sign that this broad
animus toward public sector unionization or strikes would abate any time soon.”); Joseph
Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers’ Rights? What the Federal Government Should Learn
from History and Experience, and Why, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 295, 327 (2004) (noting
widespread resistance toward public-sector collective bargaining during the 1940s and
1950s).
171. Freeman & Ichniowski, supra note 7, at 1.
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While more recent strikes by teachers’ unions have met with greater
support from some corners of the U.S. left,172 it is important to recognize
the widespread hostility to teachers’ unions that—up until quite recently—
had become mainstream within center-left, Democratic, and some progressive circles.173 The 1990s and early part of the twenty-ﬁrst century saw
a growing narrative about education reform that stressed bad teachers and
an absence of teacher accountability as key obstacles to reform.174 Failing
schools often were framed as victimizing children from poor communities
of color; teachers and administrators were the villains—protected by
unions and unaccountable to parents.175 Despite the fact that teachers’
unions often consisted of heavily female membership (often, in large
cities, with a heavy population of women of color),176 ﬁghting teachers’
unions was framed as a civil rights and racial justice cause.177 Indeed, the
growing popularity of Teach for America among liberals and progressives
signaled a move to undercut teacher tenure, seniority, and the types of job
protections associated with teachers’ unions.178 A technocratic preference
172. See, e.g., Nick French, A Different Kind of Teachers’ Strike Wave, Jacobin (Mar.
12, 2019), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/03/a-different-kind-of-teachers-strike-wave
[https://perma.cc/G4NU-5CY7]; Sarah Jaffe, The Radical Organizing that Paved the Way
for LA’s Teachers’ Strike, Nation (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/losangeles-teachers-strike-utla-organizing-solidarity [https://perma.cc/VV3R-4WZ8].
173. See infra notes 174–175.
174. See, e.g., Michelle Rhee, What It Takes to Fix Our Schools: Lessons Learned in
Washington, D.C., 6 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 39, 52 (2012) (“[Education] reforms all rest on
the creation of sound, rigorous evaluation systems, and providing constructive and reliable
feedback is absolutely necessary if we are going to value teachers as professionals and
increase teacher effectiveness.”); Bill Turque, District Teachers Approve Contract;
Agreement Expands Rhee’s Power to Fire and Bases Pay on Results, Not Seniority, Wash.
Post, June 3, 2010 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
175. See, e.g., Levin, Blue-Collar Crime, supra note 26, at 629; Waiting for Superman
(Paramount Pictures 2010) (portraying parent activists ﬁghting to help their children in an
underfunded public school).
176. Megan Dunn & James Walker, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membership
in the United States 12 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-inthe-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DLTYASA] (“In local government, women accounted for roughly 6 in 10 union members,
partially reﬂecting the large number of women employed as public-school teachers, a highly
unionized occupation.”).
177. See, e.g., Timothy DeLoache Edmonds, Note, Contracting Away Success: The Way
Teacher Collective Bargaining Agreements Are Undermining the Education of America’s
Children, 2 Colum. J. Race & L. 199, 238 (2012) (“The effects [of union CBAs] on the
country’s poor and minority children have been particularly devastating, as they have often
been subject to the worst that an already strained system has to offer.”); cf. Jonna Perillo,
Uncivil Rights: Teachers, Unions, and Race in the Battle for School Equity 115 (2012)
(“[In the 1960s, the] question of whether schools existed for the beneﬁt of students or
teachers would be all the more relevant, and the relationships between black students and
white teachers even more central to public discussions of school reform and teacher
unionism.”).
178. See, e.g., Gloria Ladson-Billings, Race . . . to the Top, Again: Comments on the
Genealogy of Critical Race Theory, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1439, 1456 & n.96 (2011) (describing
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for recent college students with elite credentials was viewed as a means of
addressing the structural ﬂaws brought about by the unions.179
Certainly, an explicitly neoliberal strand in the post-Clinton Democratic
coalition caused some of that hostility.180 But the hostility also sounds in a
language of accountability that might have much more to do with an older
model of good-government liberalism than an explicitly pro-market or proprivatization ethos.181 One nationwide poll from September, 2018, found
that despite broad support for striking public school teachers, teachers’
unions were viewed relatively negatively and were seen as a vehicle for
keeping bad teachers in classrooms: “[S]ix of 10 [Democrats] said
teachers’ unions make it harder to ﬁre bad teachers. So did three of four
Republicans.”182
The literature on public-sector unionism reﬂects a view—resonant
with critiques of police unions—that organized public-sector workers are
able to exert an unusually great amount of pressure in bargaining.183 Part
of this view stems from the suggestion that public-sector unions have “two
types of clout”: “While they usually cannot threaten a strike, they can at
least threaten discontent and noncooperation; and, in addition, they can
threaten retribution at the polls.”184 Politicians being responsive to voters
is generally viewed as a democratic good—indeed, that responsiveness is
at the heart of many of the accountability-based critiques of public-sector

“Teach For America” as a “neoliberal approach[] to management” and a means of avoiding
union power); Briana Sprick Schuster, Note, Highly Qualiﬁed Teachers: Moving Forward
from Renee v. Duncan, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 151, 156 & n.38 (2012) (collecting sources).
179. See, e.g., Ladson-Billings, supra note 178, at 1456 & n.96; Schuster, supra note 178,
at 156 & n.38.
180. See, e.g., David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism 33 (2006) (describing the
rise of neoliberalism in the 1990s); Monica Teixeira de Sousa, The State of Our Unions:
How President Obama’s Education Reforms Threaten the Working Class, 50 U. Louisville
L. Rev. 201, 202 (2011) (“President Obama has unleashed, through his education policies,
a conservative assault on unionized teachers that has very little to do with improving
education and everything to do with seeking the demise of this nation’s public sector
unions . . . .”).
181. But cf. Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution
50 (2015) (“[T]he norms and principles of neoliberal rationality do not dictate precise
economic policy, but rather set out novel ways of conceiving and relating state, society,
economy, and subject and also inaugurate a new ‘economization’ of heretofore
noneconomic spheres and endeavors.”).
182. Susan Page, Merdie Nzanga & Caroline Simon, Even When Teachers Strike,
Americans Give Them High Grades, Poll Shows. Unions Fare Worse., USA Today (Sept. 12,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/09/12/teachers-union-strike-pay/
1227089002 [https://perma.cc/C8SN-5V5S].
183. See, e.g., Neil Fox, PATCO and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law as Ideology,
1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 245, 260 (“Wellington and Winter argue that economic conditions in
the public sector . . . give public sector unions the opportunity to exert undue inﬂuence
over the budget-making process.”).
184. Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1146.
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unionism.185 But, in this account, responsiveness to public-sector workers
is not necessarily a good: These workers represent an “interest group[]”
that is subverting the proper functioning of democracy.186
Of course, one commentator’s corrupting “interest group” may well
be another commentator’s example of Tocquevillian civil society.187 To the
union sympathizer, “Democratic regimes . . . require some rough sort of
material and economic equality among their citizens if they are to survive
as democracies. By moderating the dispersion of earnings and affecting
the distribution of incomes, unions can assist in maintaining the sorts of
material conditions necessary to democratic regimes.”188 That is, the very
properties that make the union an interest group—the pooling of voices
and the advocacy for a shared, common goal—may well be the very
characteristics that make it socially desirable.
Notably, and to this end, a concern about the loss of worker voice has
been a staple of the sympathetic literature on public-sector unionism. For
example, in decrying the move to strip power from public-sector unions,
Michael Fischl argues that the role of worker voice in the public sector is
essential to preserving the potential for more democratic (private and
public) workplaces:

185. See, e.g., Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Courts, a Protected Bureaucracy,
and Reinventing Government, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 791, 792 (1995) (“The political power of
public sector unions makes it unlikely that important changes in civil service rules will be
adopted . . . .”); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and
Accountability, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1422, 1442 (2003) (arguing that the existence of public
sector unions encourages interest group participation in politics).
186. See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 185, at 1423 (“[T]here is a danger that
public actors, even if potentially more successful at pursuing a particular end, will pursue
socially undesirable ends because of political self-interest.”). Central to such a claim, of
course, remains the idea that “the public interest” is a thing that is unique and distinct from
the collected interests of groups of voters. But cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation
of American Law 1780–1860, at 51–52, 63–66 (1977) (recounting the ways in which public
takings served private interests); Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal
Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law as Market Control, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 107
(2013) [hereinafter Levin, American Gangsters] (discussing the private interests advanced
by public prosecutions). While a discussion of this concept of the “public” falls largely
outside of the scope of this Essay, the distinction itself strikes me as highly suspect and—
signiﬁcantly for purposes of this discussion—fundamentally at odds with a vision of unions
as an important democratic institution. That is, if unions serve to conglomerate the opinions
of individual workers, they are inherently advancing some set of private interests. If one
believes that this particular set of amassed private interests (as opposed to, say, other
collections of private interests, such as corporations) in fact constitutes “the public interest,”
then the public interest simply becomes a concept contingent upon a certain set of
normative preferences.
187. See supra note 186; see also Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as
Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 279, 300 (1995) (“[U]nions and the
institution of collective bargaining can act to reduce the sort of unreﬂective and ultimately
enervating dependence on the state and the other large institutions of contemporary life
that Tocqueville warned would erode the habits a democracy requires.”).
188. Kohler, supra note 187, at 301.
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[U]nions give American workers something that markets and
employers seldom afford them and that contemporary American
law does not otherwise provide: a genuine voice in important
decisions about their work lives and the power to make that voice
heard. The attack on public-sector unions thus threatens to
exacerbate what is already a breathtaking “democracy deﬁcit” in
U.S. labor relations and—should the effort gain traction and
succeed—to cut American workers altogether out of a role in
workplace governance.189
To the extent that calls for accountability bleed into greater demands for
workplace discipline and more powerful employers,190 “accountability”
necessarily undermines a normative preference for worker power. If
accountability to the public comes via employer discipline, then these
arguments become arguments to empower bosses vis-à-vis their workers.191
In turn, such a move depends on a belief that those bosses—here, higher
ranking police and other state actors—will (1) be effective in disciplining
police and (2) share the values and commitments of activists seeking to
achieve greater accountability.192
Interestingly, even though there certainly are other state actors on the
other side of the bargaining table, the obstructionist accounts or critiques
section I.A describes tend to focus exclusively on police unions as the
source of objectionable contractual provisions. Implicitly, there appears to
be an assumption that were it not for police unions, activists would have
achieved the desired reforms. Whether that counterfactual is true remains
an unanswerable empirical question.193 But notably absent from this
discussion or these critiques tends to be an acknowledgement of the role
of “management” (e.g., legislators, mayors, etc.) in these labor negotiations. Ignoring management’s place in the bargaining process risks letting
actual elected officials pass the buck and suggests that it is the job of the
union—not the elected officials—to look out for the public interest.194

189. Fischl, Running the Government, supra note 23, at 40.
190. See Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 2265, 2268
(2018) [hereinafter Levin, Criminal Employment Law] (examining how public support for
worker accountability and discipline empowers employers and hurts workers).
191. See id.; cf. Ahmed A. White, My Coworker, My Enemy: Solidarity, Workplace
Control, and the Class Politics of Title VII, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2015) (arguing that
Title VII has been interpreted in a way that “enhances employers authoritarian control of
the workplace” as employers are tasked with policing worker misconduct).
192. Cf. Levin, Criminal Employment Law, supra note 190, at 2316–18 (arguing that
employers might have different values and incentives than other members of the public).
193. It is conceivable that we might be able to examine the policies in jurisdictions
without police unions to see if there were different rules in place. But any such comparison
would need to account for a range of variables—local politics, the relevant history of police
violence and police–civilian interactions, and so forth.
194. Indeed, some critical accounts of police unions suggest that they have “bullied”
politicians into enacting pro-police policies or shying away from greater oversight. See, e.g.,
David Firestone, The NYC Police Union Has a Long History of Bullying City Hall, Quartz
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(Relatedly, such simpliﬁed accounts obscure the fact that government
actors might make concessions on CBA provisions relating to oversight as
a means of avoiding police demands regarding wages, hours, and benefits.)
By way of analogy, imagine a municipality with a unionized sanitation
department. The sanitation workers’ CBA is about to expire, so the union
and the municipal government enter into collective bargaining. Union
representatives ask for increased pay and that trash collection days fall only
once a month, rather than once a week. The government representatives
are concerned about the municipality’s budget and conclude that the pay
increase is out of the question. When the union representatives threaten
a strike or slowdown, the government decides to cave to the union’s
demand regarding trash collection (because that demand wouldn’t have
a direct budgetary effect). As one could imagine, the populace would be
extremely upset with once-monthly trash collection (and there might be a
public health emergency).
Whose fault is the limited trash collection? On the one hand, perhaps
it’s the union’s fault: Certainly, the workers were upset about not getting
paid more, but the once-a-month demand was unreasonable and ran
counter to the public interest. Additionally, perhaps sanitation workers
have expertise that would make them better positioned to appreciate just
how much trash the municipality produced and how harmful a single-day
collection would be.195 On the other hand, perhaps it’s the government’s
fault: Politicians, unlike the workers or union representatives, were elected
to serve the public interest. Balancing imperfect outcomes is a politician’s
job, and when politicians choose wrong, the buck stops with them.
Critiques of teachers’ unions and other public-sector unions often
sound in the language of democratic failures: Because of union politics
and the outsized inﬂuence of organized labor, democracy has been
subverted.196 Rather than serving the interests of the community, the
argument goes, some corner of the public sector has been captured and
has come to serve the interest of organized labor.197 But this is a highly

(Dec. 23, 2014), https://qz.com/317338/the-nyc-police-union-has-a-long-history-of-bullyingcity-hall [https://perma.cc/EQ9L-4GD5].
195. While scholars contest just how much expertise police have, judges and legislators
tend to invoke police expertise when deferring to officer decisionmaking. See, e.g., Anna
Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1995, 1997 (2017);
Josh Segal, Note, ‘All of the Mysticism of Police Expertise’: Legalizing Stop-and-Frisk in New
York, 1961–1968, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 573, 575 (2012).
196. See supra Part I.
197. See, e.g., Walker Bragman, The Union Fight that Deﬁned Beto O’Rourke’s City
Council Days, Intercept (Jan. 13, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/01/13/beto-orourke-public-sector-unions [https://perma.cc/T3KM-CX4U] (“At the height of the
conﬂict, O’Rourke publicly mused about disbanding the police union, calling it ‘out of
control’ and lamenting his colleagues’ unwillingness to stand up to the powerful political
force.”).

1368

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1333

selective application of capture theory198—in other words, it appears to rest
on a belief that elected officials, absent union pressure, would “do the
right thing” and be responsive to otherwise powerless constituents. Of
course, this an empirical question, but the argument seems dubious when
the constituents in question lack major political clout. If we are willing to
concede that democracy isn’t pure and that elected officials are inﬂuenced
by powerful interests (a shocking concession, to be sure, but please bear
with me), then removing public-sector unions would simply mean removing one of many powerful interest groups. Maybe that would yield good
outcomes. But the argument driving “education reform” and other antipublic-sector union efforts appears to rest on a view that the unions, not
the government actors, are getting it wrong. If the problem truly is a
democratic one (i.e., poor people, people of color, and others from
marginalized communities lack meaningful political representation), why
would that problem evaporate in a world without police unions?
I return to this relationship among government, union, and polity in
section IV.B. For the time being, though, I simply wish to stress the ways in
which the prevalent critiques of police unions sound much like critiques
of other disfavored or controversial public-sector unions. In the next Part,
I examine a range of distinctions that might explain why police unions
could be viewed as exceptional in discussions of organized labor.
III. WHY IS THIS UNION UNLIKE ALL OTHER UNIONS?
For union supporters who ﬁnd themselves embracing critiques of
police unions, the analysis in the previous Part might be unsettling. Are
those of us worried about policing actually advancing a set of arguments
and policy proposals that undercut unionism, particularly public-sector
unionism? Why don’t arguments for whittling away procedural and
employment protections for police apply to teachers or other public-sector
workers?
Certainly, some readers might enthusiastically say, “They do!” To
those readers, police unions might operate as a particularly egregious
example of an otherwise corrupt and objectionable phenomenon—the
public-sector union. Those readers would embrace the police union
critiques if applied elsewhere, arguing that the logic of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) simply does not extend to workers who are supposed to serve the public interest. Some of those readers—perhaps,
adherents to a neoclassical or Chicago School economic model—might
reject unionization across the board as a form of cartelization hostile to

198. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1284 (2006) (describing “capture theory”); Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 555 n.33 (2000) (examining
“how government can use market mechanisms to solve problems”).
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efficient markets.199 Others might be more sympathetic to organized labor
in the private sector, but may view unions as a bad ﬁt in public-sector
workplaces.200
But what about scholars who consider themselves supportive of the
unionization project? Is it possible to embrace the critiques articulated in
Part I while still retaining a principled justiﬁcation for public-sector unionism?201 And, even if it is, can the critiques themselves be cabined neatly,
such that they don’t easily migrate to debates about other public-sector
unions?202 As a formal, doctrinal matter, there certainly are differences
between police unions and many other public-sector unions.203 But, as
discussed above, those differences are generally limited in scope and, if
anything, restrict the rights of police unions as compared to other
unions.204
This Part traces a few possible distinguishing features that might set
police unions apart and allay fears of an unintended endorsement of the
anti-union playbook. As I argue at greater length in the next Part, it is not
clear that any of these distinctions does the necessary work. Or, maybe
more importantly, the distinctions might tell us much more about policing
(and objections to it) than about unions.
A.

Use of Force

Perhaps the most obvious and intuitively appealing distinction rests
on police officers’ ability to use force.205 As one police-union critic puts it,
“[s]ocial workers and teachers don’t ﬁre bullets into the hearts and heads
of unarmed people, or impose brute order when social unrest proves too
199. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 607,
624 (1990) (“[N]eoclassicists welcome the precipitous decline of unions because they consider
unions the most signiﬁcant interference with the freely operating labor market. For the
neoclassicists, unions are cartels that capture monopoly rents for a privileged sector at the
expense of both consumer welfare and the remainder of the labor market.”); Richard A.
Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 988, 1011 (1984).
200. See, e.g., Fischl, Running the Government, supra note 23, at 63–65 (describing
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s views on the incompatibility of unions with public service).
201. See John Pfaff (@JohnPfaff), Twitter (Jan. 13, 2019), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/
status/1084558610498310144 [https://perma.cc/T56D-VZ27] (“I understand the challenge
the left feels in opposing [police] unions in a time of general attack on union[s], public
sector unions in particular. But they remain ﬁerce opponents of reform, and generally back
policies/candidates whose views don’t align [with] traditional union views.”).
202. Cf. Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion
Discourse, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1195–97 (2010) (tracking the migration, or cooptation, of feminist trauma discourse into the basis for antifeminist court decisions
restricting reproductive rights).
203. See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text.
204. See supra section II.A.
205. See Firestone, supra note 194 (“The members of no other union carry guns in
public, or are responsible for public safety. Police unions carry a special burden to act in the
highest interest of the city, but over many decades, no other union has acted less
responsibly.”).
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acute for less coercive paciﬁcation.”206 Certainly, force is central to the role
and power of police officers in the United States.207 To the extent we
conceive of the role of police as preserving or ensuring “order,” “there
should be little doubt that police secure order through threats of superior
physical force, and at least sometimes, actual exercises of it.”208 Critically,
the Supreme Court has consistently condoned the use of force, up to and
including deadly force, in the context of lawful arrests.209 Put simply, every
police–civilian encounter carries with it the risk of an officer’s resorting to
lethal force.210 As agents of the state empowered to act out the official
monopoly on violence,211 police appear very different from the teacher or
the bus driver. Because of this monopoly on violence, the reasoning would
go, police are sui generis (or, at least, fall into a special category with other
armed agents of the state).
This distinction is descriptively accurate.212 Police officers go to work
armed and are told by their superiors and every branch of the government
that they can use lethal force. The vast majority of other workers have no
such authority or directive. But is this a distinction without a difference?213

206. Gude, Support Police Unions, supra note 65.
207. See, e.g., Williams, Our Enemies in Blue, supra note 54, at 27 (“Police brutality is
pervasive, systemic, and inherent to the institution.”); Alice Ristroph, The Thin Blue Line
from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 305, 306 (2018) (“Force is
always at the background of police action, so much so that classic sociological descriptions
of the police focus on their authority and readiness to use physical force.”).
208. Ristroph, supra note 207, at 306; see also Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115
Mich. L. Rev. 307, 308 (2016) (“It is no exaggeration to say that handcuffing a suspect and
taking him to jail is the paradigmatic police activity.”).
209. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“Our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof
to effect it.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968))); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 11 (1985) (“Where [an] officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”).
210. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Opinion, Law Puts Us All in Same Danger as Eric Garner,
Bloomberg (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-12-04/lawputs-us-all-in-same-danger-as-eric-garner [https://perma.cc/97MX-LX3N] (emphasizing
the role of overcriminalization in the pervasive nature of police violence).
211. See, e.g., Zanita E. Fenton, Disarming State Action; Discharging State Responsibility, 52
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 47, 47–48 (2017) (noting the state’s monopoly on power and
including law enforcement within that monopoly).
212. That said, there certainly are many tasks involved in policing or undertaken by
police that do not involve use of force and do not resemble the functions that are the topic
of much policing scholarship. See Seth W. Stoughton, Moonlighting: The Private
Employment of Off-Duty Officers, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1847, 1849–51.
213. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 1349 (1982) (“Success for a legal distinction has two facets. First,
it must be possible to make the distinction . . . . Second, the distinction must make a
difference . . . . Making a difference means that it seems plain that situations should be
treated differently depending on which category of the distinction they fall into.”).
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The best case to be made rests on some form of forfeiture analysis:
Because police are granted a range of unique powers in society, they must
give up certain rights in exchange, and society should hold them to a
higher standard.214 Qualified immunity and constitutional doctrines protect
police decisionmaking,215 this argument goes, so officers shouldn’t be
entitled to further protections. Or, in more familiar terms, “with great
power comes great responsibility.”216 As a practical matter, though, too
often courts and legislatures appear to take the opposite approach—
holding police officers to a lower standard than they would hold
civilians.217
But operationalizing the forfeiture logic is easier said than done.
What rights should police give up, and how closely related should those
rights be to their authorization to use force? Should wealthier, stronger,
or otherwise more privileged workers be stripped of bargaining rights? Or,
put differently, is our defense of unionization rooted in a vision of an
otherwise powerless proletariat? There’s certainly a lot of space to reduce
police powers and to make their legal rights and liabilities more closely
resemble those of their civilian counterparts. But at what point does
stripping rights remedy concerns about abusive policing?218
If the priority in crafting legal rules is reducing police uses of force,
it’s not clear why eliminating organizing rights is directly responsive.
Indeed, if we wished to equalize the status of police and other workers, it
would make much more sense to attempt to chip away at the use of force
authorization or the other rights that set police above other workers. This
could be done via qualiﬁed immunity reform (an increasingly popular
intervention),219 by disarming police, or by dramatically reducing their
214. Scholars and courts have deployed analogous forfeiture-style arguments in other
treatments of policing. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Police Encounters with Race and Gender, 5
U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 735, 749 (2015) (“The officer in uniform is thus disabled from insisting
on respect in the sorts of ways she could were she a layperson.”).
215. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualiﬁed immunity defense
has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”).
216. Spider-Man (Columbia Pictures 2002).
217. See Balko, supra note 29, at 336 (“[L]egislatures rarely if ever pass new laws to
hold police more accountable, to restrict their powers, or to make them more
transparent.”).
218. Kate Levine has argued that such a general approach—depriving police of rights—
does little to remedy structural ﬂaws in the criminal system. See generally Levine, How We
Prosecute, supra note 90 (arguing that police are treated more favorably than civilians when
they are the subject of criminal prosecutions, particularly in the form of receiving a special
precharge and preindictment process); Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 12 (arguing that
police have special procedural protections that civilians do not have when they are the
subject of criminal investigations).
219. See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the Court’s expansive application of qualiﬁed immunity); William Baude, Is
Qualiﬁed Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 45, 88 (2018) (arguing that qualiﬁed
immunity has no constitutional basis and that the Supreme Court should dial back the
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rights to use force or arrest.220 That police officers retain these rights and
advantages might be troubling and might lessen the sense that they need
the sort of empowerment that union representation affords. But if that’s
the case, then restricting organizing and bargaining rights simply becomes
a second-order mechanism for regulating the ﬁrst-order problem (i.e.,
violence).221
This observation isn’t to contest the important point that police
unions inﬂuence policy. Unionization strengthens the political power of
police, and because police are a more powerful lobby, politicians are more
likely to support pro-police policies that hamper accountability. Since
politicians support such policies, it becomes increasingly difficult for
heavily policed communities to have their voices heard and hold officers
accountable.222 That said, many other second-order regulations might also
diminish officers’ ability to shape policy: more heavily restricting speech
rights, diminishing pay, or even gerrymandering to dilute votes in neighborhoods with larger police populations.223 Yet there might be reasons to
worry about each of those policy proposals. They would harm police, but
they also drift further away from the ﬁrst-order problem/regulatory goal
while potentially diminishing other democratic values.
Finally, one additionally might argue that the authorization of force
also should affect the analysis because of what it does to power
relationships. While this claim rests on a power analysis (much like the
doctrinal protections); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualiﬁed Immunity Fails, 127 Yale L.J. 2,
9 (2017) (arguing that the qualiﬁed immunity doctrine is ineffective); Fred O. Smith, Jr.,
Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2283, 2305 (2018) (“Collectively,
then, academic literature in the ﬁeld of federal jurisdiction is calling for a new round of
remedial calibration with respect to immunities in constitutional litigation.”).
220. Such proposals are not unheard of in the literature on police use of force. See, e.g.,
James Jacobs, Disarming the Police Would Make Gun Control Effective, in Gun Control 42,
43 (Charles P. Cozic ed., 1992) (arguing that disarming police might contribute to a broader
disarmament); Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 25–27 (critiquing police
reliance on guns); Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: DeEscalation, Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 629, 636
n.17 (collecting sources); Matthew Walther, Opinion, Police Officers Do Not Need Guns,
Week (Sept. 13, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/795599/police-officers-not-needguns
[https://perma.cc/X87J-X9QH] (“I think we should consider the possibility of a return to
a style of policing in which officers do not, under ordinary circumstances, carry guns or wear
black body armor.”).
221. I borrow here from John Rappaport’s description of ﬁrst- and second-order police
regulatory approaches. See Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation, supra note 59, at 210.
222. See supra Part I.
223. That’s not to mention regulations involving insurance, indemniﬁcation, and other
second-order and subconstitutional mechanisms for altering police behavior. See generally
John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (2017)
(assessing the effects of liability insurance on police behavior and how legal reforms within
the insurance liability market could reduce police misconduct); Joanna C. Schwartz, How
Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1144 (2016)
(examining the impact of lawsuits, particularly budgetary arrangements to pay settlements
and judgments, on police reform efforts).
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forfeiture argument does), the argument is slightly different: To the
extent that unionization is justiﬁed in terms of evening out the power
imbalances of capitalism, perhaps the use of force already takes care of
that imbalance. It’s an interesting argument that might intersect with (or,
perhaps, subvert) a larger literature on gun ownership and inequality,224
but it doesn’t do much work. Police are authorized to use force against
civilians in a range of contexts. But the relevant imbalance of power for
assessing the need for collective bargaining is not the imbalance between
police and civilians; rather, from a contractual perspective, the “inequality
of bargaining power” stems from or deﬁnes the relationship between workers
and their bosses.225 So, for force to have signiﬁcant purchase in a labor
analysis, that force would need to counteract the inherent power that bosses
enjoy over workers. While police certainly are granted signiﬁcant leeway
in their use of force,226 courts and legislatures hardly have blessed some
sort of labor violence. Indeed, courts and legislatures are hostile to the
suggestion that police unions can even strike (i.e., use nonviolent
economic coercion): Forty-two states and the District of Columbia explicitly outlaw police strikes, and only two states allow police union strikes.227
The authorization to use force certainly is a distinguishing feature of
U.S. police and differentiates them from other workers and other
members of society. But that authorization ultimately has little to do with
224. See, e.g., Nicholas Johnson, Negroes and the Gun: The Black Tradition of
Arms 13 (2014) (“The black tradition of arms has been submerged because it seems hard
to reconcile with the dominant narrative of nonviolence in the modern civil-rights
movement.”); Akinyele Omowale Umoja, We Will Shoot Back: Armed Resistance in the
Mississippi Freedom Movement 254–59 (2013) (summarizing historical developments in
armed resistance among Black Americans); Robert F. Williams, Negroes with Guns 110–
25 (Marc Schleifer ed., 2013) (1962) (reconciling a movement toward self-defense among
Black Americans and contemporary nonviolent discourse).
225. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (“No doubt, wherever the right
of private property exists, there must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally
happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by
circumstances.”); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 470–71 (1923) (“[T]he systems advocated by professed upholders
of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive restrictions of individual freedom . . .
out of conformity with any formula of ‘equal opportunity’ or of ‘preserving the rights of
others.’”); Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 Legal Stud.
Forum 327, 327 (1991) (synthesizing the views of Hale and Foucault to develop an approach
for evaluating the “role of law in the reproduction of social injustice in late capitalist
societies”).
226. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”).
227. See Sanes & Schmitt, supra note 129, at 8 chart 3 (summarizing the legality of
strikes across the states); cf. Potts v. Hay, 318 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Ark. 1958) (“We are not
convinced that . . . union membership on the part of police officers presents such a threat
to the public welfare that an implied exception must be written into the unqualiﬁed
language of [a state constitutional amendment declaring that police unionization runs
counter to the nature of their employment].”).
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labor organizing or the relative power of labor and management in collective bargaining.
B.

Police as Bosses or Managers?

Perhaps another way of distinguishing police unions from other
unions is the social status of the unionized workers. Unions are heterogeneous in politics, interests, and approach, and perhaps the arguments
raised in Part II suffer from a ﬂattening out of class; that is, just because
police are workers and police unions are unions doesn’t necessarily mean
that one need accept that every union or every worker should receive the
same treatment or bundle of rights.228 If the project at the heart of unionization is class consciousness, how do we delineate class or determine how
to advance solidarity?229 Put simply, class is not so simple; the “working
class was never the singular social and historical entity suggested by the
phrase.”230
In his writings on class consciousness, Marxist theorist Georg Lukács
recognizes the challenge inherent in such a project:
[I]s the problem of class consciousness a ‘general’ sociological
problem or does it mean one thing for the proletariat and
another for every other class to have emerged hitherto? . . . [I]s
class consciousness homogeneous in nature and function or can
we discern different gradations and levels in it? And if so, what
are their practical implications for the class struggle of the
proletariat?231
One response would be that such divisions are hostile to the broader
project of solidarity and worker empowerment. These divisions, the argument
228. See infra section IV.A.2.
229. The question of how to address challenges to workplace and worker solidarity
remains a pressing one in the literature on labor law and class. See, e.g., Rick Fantasia,
Cultures of Solidarity: Consciousness, Action, and Contemporary American Workers 26, 36,
45, 54–59 (1988) (detailing the impact of federal labor relations legislation on
unionization); Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1819, 1867
(1992) (“[U]nions sacriﬁced the solidarity that once served as the source of workers’
empowerment. Lacking a sense of connection and empathy with other workers in the union,
members lost trust; lacking the feeling of empowerment that comes with the experience of
directly effecting change, members lost faith.”); Patricia Ewick, Postmodern Melancholia,
26 L. & Soc’y Rev. 755, 760 (1992) (“Class-consciousness is understood to be not a form of
revealed wisdom but something that is constructed through social interaction.”); Martha R.
Mahoney, What’s Left of Solidarity? Reﬂections on Law, Race, and Labor History, 57 Buff.
L. Rev. 1515, 1563 (2009) (“Class-conscious mutuality, solidarity, and group action are not
always protected under federal labor law . . . . Legal constraints become part of the culture
within which people live and work, and therefore part of the way people understand the
world and act within it.”); White, supra note 191, at 1064 (arguing that Title VII and its
enforcement have impeded worker solidarity).
230. Cedric J. Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition 42
(Univ. of N.C. Press 2000) (1983).
231. Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics 46
(Rodney Livingstone trans., Merlin Press 1971) (1923).
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goes, “are pure and simple illusions or, worse, pure and simple impostures,
milked for all they are worth in the capitalist class struggle against the
workers’ class struggle for the purpose of maintaining workers in the
condition of the exploited.”232 Class, in this view, operates as a sort of
shorthand. Of course, there are differences among workers with the same
income or the same education, but by invoking the concept of “class,”
scholars and union advocates are necessarily smoothing out those
distinctions.233
The inter- and intra-industry challenge of addressing heterogeneity is
not simply a theoretical problem; rather, it stands at the heart of the
workplace’s legal architecture. U.S. labor and employment laws distinguish among classes of workers,234 affording different rights and causes of
action to different groups depending on their status in labor markets or
production chains.235 While these legal frameworks may fail to protect the
interests of particularly marginalized workers (e.g., temporary workers or
contractors),236 they generally protect the rights of lower wage/status
workers, rather than the rights of bosses, managers, or some professional
workers.237
232. Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological
State Apparatuses 35–36 (G.M. Goshgarian trans., Verso 2014) (1971); see also Robinson,
supra note 230, at 42 (“[T]he dialectic of prolitarianization disciplined the working classes
to the importance of distinctions . . . . The persistence and creation of such oppositions
within the working classes were a critical aspect of the triumph of capitalism in the
nineteenth century.”).
233. Cf. Flora Tristan, The Workers’ Union 39–41 (Beverly Livingston trans., Univ. of
Ill. Press 1983) (1843) (advocating for a more capacious class solidarity via sweeping
unionization).
234. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944) (distinguishing
“employees” and “independent contractors” as different classes of workers); Frito-Lay,
Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1013 (1973) (identifying geographic and control–autonomy
distinctions).
235. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees:
Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 251 (2006) (describing legal approaches to regulating precarious
and liminal labor markets).
236. See, e.g., V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of
Legal Worker Identities, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 65, 89–95 (2017) (describing the legal hurdles
facing workers who don’t fall easily into speciﬁc categories); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment
Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685, 2698–99 (2008) (describing how the NLRA fails
to cover independent contractors).
237. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974) (concluding that
the NLRA does not cover managerial employees); Marion G. Crain, Building Solidarity
Through Expansion of NLRA Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 Minn.
L. Rev. 953, 959 (1990) (noting “the exclusion of middle-level employees from NLRA
coverage”); Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness
and Transformative Politics, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 937, 943 (2007) (“[C]ourts issued decisions
deﬁning the scope of the bargaining unit to exclude ‘managerial employees.’” (quoting
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980))); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing
Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1775,
1794–96 (1989) (discussing the managerial exclusions derived from ambiguous Taft–
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In the legal academic literature and public debates on policing, there
is a troubling tendency to erase institutional hierarchies and elide all
classes of police, such that the beat cop is the same as the detective, is the
same as the investigator, is the same as the chief.238 This ﬂattening is a
problem because it erases the workplace realities of policing: Everyone is
not similarly situated, orders are given and taken, and some law enforcement actors are more responsible for policy and institutional decisionmaking than others.239 From the perspective of a union proponent, such a
ﬂattening might be beneﬁcial as a means of building class consciousness
or a “culture of solidarity” across internal institutional divisions.240 For
union critics, though, precision should be important in diagnosing who or
what is so problematic about police unions: Who are the actors responsible
for enacting problematic policies, who are the actors most likely to have
working relationships with civilians, and who are the actors best positioned
to impose internal discipline and accountability?241
Even accepting that police departments are ﬁercely hierarchical,
police (even those with the lowest departmental status) might still be
viewed as representing the interests of bosses—i.e., the forces of capital—
rather than labor. In other words, the concern at the heart of police union
critiques is not focused on internal labor dynamics at all; instead, the focus
is on the broader place of police in the U.S. political economy. In the resolution seeking the expulsion of police unions from the AFL-CIO, this
critique rears its head:
While it is true that police are workers, and thus hypothetically
subject to the same kinds of exploitation as other laborers, they
are also the militarized, coercive arm of the state. It is the job of
the police to protect capital and, consequently, maintain class
Hartley provisions); Donna Sockell, The Future of Labor Law: A Mismatch Between
Statutory Interpretation and Industrial Reality?, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 987, 992–93 (1989)
(discussing “the complexities of drawing distinctions among individuals eligible and
ineligible for [NLRA] coverage”).
238. But cf. Tracy Meares & Tom Tyler, Policing: A Model for the Twenty-First Century,
in Policing the Black Man: Arrest, Prosecution, and Imprisonment 161, 173 (Angela J. Davis
ed., 2017) (“[P]olice officers want from their commanders the same sort of fairness that the
public wants from them. And . . . officers often feel they do not receive their due even in
their own station houses. Hence, it is also important to rethink the organization of police
forces . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
239. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 722 (“Police departments are hierarchical,
with a chain of command as in the military and a sharp division between the leadership and
the rank-and-ﬁle.” (footnote omitted)).
240. See generally Fantasia, supra note 229, at 24 (“The location of, and the possibilities
for, worker mobilization and collective action today have been profoundly shaped by
previous struggles, processes, and initiatives, and it is by understanding this changing terrain
that contemporary cultures of solidarity can be properly situated.”).
241. Such a nuanced approach would be responsive to the growing critique that
accounts of criminal justice policy suffer from “insufficient concentration on diverse actors
and conﬂict.” Philip Goodman, Joshua Page & Michelle Phelps, Breaking the Pendulum:
The Long Struggle over Criminal Justice 7 (2017).
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society. How can there ever be solidarity between law
enforcement and the working class when elites call upon police
and their organizations to quell mass resistance to poverty and
inequality? The police force exists solely to uphold the status quo.
Their material survival depends on it, and they hold a vested
interest in the preservation and expansion of the most
deplorable practices of the state.242
In seeking to disown police unions or expel them from the labor movement, critics have argued that police unions never were a part of the labor
movement: Historically, organized police served to brutalize and impede
the progress of workers.243 Or, as a Jacobin editor argues, the “inherent
defect of law enforcement unionism” remains that “[i]t’s peopled by those
with a material interest in maintaining and enlarging the state’s most
indefensible practices.”244 The claim isn’t that officers are bosses in the
sense of the literal boss–worker dialectic. Rather, it’s that police are the
tools of capital, of bosses, and of antiworker structures of power.245
Some sort of claim that police unions are inextricable from the
violence of capitalism (or, capital’s violence against labor) gets us closer
to an argument for police abolition.246 I will put a pin in that discussion—
the broader question of whether policing is a desirable social institution—
for the moment and return to it in the next Part.247 But I worry about this
framing of police unions in which the unions represent capital and hierarchy, while (apparently) all other unions represent labor and a resistance
to hierarchy.
First, as discussed above,248 such a move ﬂattens out internal police
hierarchies and seems to take for granted that because an institution or
industry (here, the police) is hierarchical or politically problematic, then
internal hierarchies or abuses within the institution shouldn’t be concerning.249 That is, does adopting an abolitionist approach necessarily mean
242. Letter from United Auto Workers Local 2865 to AFL-CIO, supra note 47.
243. See id. (“Police unions in particular emerge out of a long history of police
intervention in labor politics and its complicity in racial violence.”).
244. Gude, The Bad Kind of Unionism, supra note 63; see also Jon Ben-Menachem
(@jbenmenachem), Twitter (Jan. 13, 2019), https://twitter.com/jbenmenachem/status/
1084490021950902273 [https://perma.cc/U9QV-D35Q] (“I’d argue that police unions
shouldn’t be considered ‘public sector unions,’ because they perpetuate class inequity.”).
245. Contrary to this narrative of police unions as inherently hostile to other forms of
organized labor, it is worth noting that early police unionization efforts met with substantial
resistance because “business and anti-labor groups feared that unionized police would strike
and, more important, would not stop other employees from striking and picketing.” Fisk &
Richardson, supra note 12, at 735.
246. See Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 228 (describing police as a
key feature and defender of “intertwined systems of oppression”).
247. See infra section IV.B.
248. See supra notes 238–239 and accompanying text.
249. Notably, while the contemporary discourse on police unions tends to focus on
public oversight, unionization initially stemmed from concerns about internal hierarchy.
See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 734 (“Police officers in many cities began joining
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rejecting concerns about internal, institutional mistreatment? Does
embracing abolition mean concluding that beat cops shouldn’t be able to
ﬁle a Title VII claim against their employers or grieve if they aren’t paid
for overtime? By way of analogy, one certainly could adopt a prison
abolitionist ethic,250 while recognizing that correctional officers might be
treated poorly by their superiors. It strikes me as logically defensible to
argue that there should be no prison guards, but that as long as there are
prison guards, they should earn a decent wage, receive decent health
insurance, or receive protection from abuse at the hands of their employers.251 (As Part IV demonstrates, though, this observation certainly isn’t
meant to suggest that abolitionists or, for that matter, reformers, should
be prioritizing the interests of police or correctional officers.)252
Additionally, this framing of police and focus on relative power
understates the ways in which other workers—particularly public-sector
workers—may exercise power or retain various hierarchical advantages
over other workers or other members of the polity. Take the example of
teachers’ unions. To sympathetic commentators, the teachers’ union
might be a necessary vehicle for underpaid, overworked public servants to
retain some dignity and advocate for their interests.253 Those accounts
might stress low teacher salaries or the demographics of public school
teachers, with an eye to race and gender.254 In these accounts, teachers are
invaluable public servants who have been undervalued and mistreated. To
unsympathetic commentators on the left and right, though, the teachers’
unions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when workers in every industry
unionized, and for the same reasons—to improve pay and working conditions and to gain
some measure of control over their work lives.”).
250. See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. Rev.
1156, 1161–62 (2015) [hereinafter McLeod, Prison Abolition] (“By a ‘prison abolitionist
ethic,’ I . . . invoke . . . a moral orientation elaborated in an existing body of abolitionist
writings and nascent social movement efforts, which are committed to ending the practice
of conﬁning people in cages and eliminating the control of human beings through . . .
threatened police use of violent force.”).
251. There remains, of course, a question of political capital, resources, etc. Scholars,
advocates, and politicians can’t cure all of the world’s ills and do not have the capacity to
take on and remedy every injustice. In a universe of scarce resources, then, why advocate for
the rights of the relatively powerful? That’s a fair question, and one that I have begun to
address elsewhere. See Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 491, 545–46 (2019); see also supra note 218 and accompanying text. But
whether advancing police labor rights is a worthwhile goal is a very different question from
whether police should have labor rights at all. I take most scholarly and popular commentary
to be focusing much more on the latter than the former.
252. See infra notes 345–351.
253. See Marion C. Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor Unions, Solidarity, and Money, 22
Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 259, 291–94 (2018) (collecting sources).
254. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, 2 in 3 Americans Say Public School Teachers Are Underpaid,
Wash. Post (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/two-inthree-americans-say-public-school-teachers-are-underpaid/2018/08/27/cddf5b6a-a953-11e8
-b1da-ff7faa680710_story.html?utm_term=.64b2d14d917e (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review); Page et al., supra note 182.
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union starts to look more like a management union.255 If students (particularly students from underserved or marginalized communities) are the
primary point of empathy, identiﬁcation, or concern, then teachers are
only meaningful in that they advance the interests of the student. To the
extent they don’t, then they are yet another set of (relatively) powerful actors
complicit in the subordination of powerless young people. As a cog in a
dysfunctional education system and—perhaps—the school-to-prison
pipeline, the teacher might be viewed as a bully, an authoritarian, and even
analogous to a police officer.
There’s no denying that police (and, by extension, police unions)
have an ugly history of suppressing labor and of complicity with the violence of capital and of white supremacy.256 But, as Part IV discusses, how
much of support for unionization and worker organizing does or should
rest on a belief that the job in question is socially desirable? Should the
Mine Workers’ Union be less deserving of political or theoretical support
because its members’ work contributes to the fossil fuel industry and
attendant environmental harm?
C.

Nature of Bargaining Power

Related to the previous argument, perhaps we might simply
distinguish police unions because of their relative bargaining power or
social status. As police labor leaders have noted, police unions occupy a
peculiar place because police are much better off than most workers.257
The police labor movement has been a success: “As a result of collective
bargaining rights . . . and political activism among police unions, officers
are for the most part well-compensated. Salaries in many urban areas
exceed $100,000, where the central department and suburbs must keep
up with each other in order to recruit the most qualiﬁed candidates.”258
This success, though, operates as a double-edged sword. “No one should
begrudge law enforcement officers these beneﬁts and job protections,”
the union leaders argue.259 But those beneﬁts are not without costs:

255. See supra section II.B.; see also Thaddeus Russell (@ThaddeusRussell), Twitter
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://twitter.com/ThaddeusRussell/status/1084900565484679171 [https://
perma.cc/ZUD5-YS2P] (“My teachers in Oakland were petty authoritarians who knew
nothing about me and tracked me into remedial English. I learned nothing from them.
They were gloriﬁed prison guards. My son and I feel the same about his [striking] teachers
in LA. Please don’t stand with them.”).
256. See Donner, supra note 110, at 1 (“[Police units] have, beginning in the Gilded
Age, predominantly engaged in political repression, which in the context of policing, may
be deﬁned as police behavior motivated of inﬂuenced in whole or in part by . . . activities
perceived as a threat to the status quo.”); Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 40
(“In some cases, early police forces were created speciﬁcally for the purpose of suppressing
workers’ movements.”).
257. See Ron DeLord et al., supra note 73, at x.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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The problem is that police officers are well-entrenched in the
middle class, outdistancing many other workers in the community
who don’t receive the array of beneﬁts and protections that
officers do. Police unions must depend on public support for
their pursuit of better wages and beneﬁts; and support becomes
more difficult when other workers in the community make
considerably less in wages; pay high monthly premiums for
substandard health insurance; and are struggling for economic
survival.260
Police officers are not only granted a range of legal protections and
authorized to use force; often, they’re also relatively well-situated in an
increasingly stratiﬁed economy.
Nevertheless, for their economic status to make much difference, we
would need to assume that (1) their incomes and relative social status
make them different from most unionized or unionizing workers, and (2)
a principled defense of unionism can only defend the rights of the most
marginalized workers.261 The ﬁrst point appears debatable, at best. Since
the high-water mark of U.S. unionization in the wake of the Second World
War, the largest growth sector for organized labor has been among whitecollar workers, particularly within the public sector.262 Certainly, salaries,
beneﬁts, and social status of “white-collar” workers vary dramatically. But
any suggestion that unions exist only in particularly low-wage service
sectors would appear to be empirically unfounded.263
The next Part discusses the second point at greater length.264 Nevertheless, for the time being, it is worth noting that a class-conscious politics
or theoretical defense of unionism generally doesn’t depend upon a workforce that is the absolute poorest or most socially marginal. Certainly,
there are many compelling historical examples that sound more like this
extreme—from the United Farm Workers,265 to more recent work by the
260. Id.
261. As discussed in the previous section, there might be another possibility: that police
had effectively eliminated the distinction between boss and worker and therefore become
capital. I certainly can imagine a sliding scale of enthusiasm for unions or unionization,
where they appear more vital the greater the power imbalance between boss and worker,
and less vital the smaller the imbalance. But, to the extent one accepts the justiﬁcations of
unionization common in the literature, I’m not sure why unions are necessarily a problem
at the “less inequality” end of the spectrum. Further, mapping work relationships on a
spectrum is easier said than done, and it’s not clear exactly where police would fall (or,
whether all officers in all departments or jurisdictions would fall in the same place).
262. See Michael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds 231 (2004).
263. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1, at 7–10 tbls.3 & 4
(showing that unionization and wage rates do not correlate).
264. See infra section IV.A.2.
265. See The Rise of the UFW, United Farm Workers, https://ufw.org/research/history/
ufw-history [https://perma.cc/RD99-5J5M] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (“[California’s long
exploited] farmworkers had tried but failed so many times to organize the giant agribusiness
farms that most observers considered it a hopeless task. And yet by the . . . [the mid-1970s]
more than 50,000 farmworkers were protected by union contracts.”).
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Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in its “Justice for Janitors”
campaigns.266 And unions hardly are (or have been) the voice of the
rich.267 But it would be ahistorical to claim that the U.S. labor movement
had revolved exclusively around the lowest-paid or most socially marginalized workers.268 Indeed, some of the great labor “success stories” involve
unions that effectively created the post-World War II middle class.269
All of which is to say that a theory of unionization that rests on an
image of the most marginal worker needs to grapple with the reality of the
U.S. labor market. Are higher-skill, higher-wage sectors in which unions
retain great power (professional sports, entertainment, certain sectors of
construction) undesirable outliers?270 Or, should these sectors serve as a
model for more of the workforce and the U.S. economy? Do unions have
a meaningful role to play when the organizing workers are already relatively well off, or, at least, are not struggling with immediate hunger or
eviction?
In some sense, these questions cut to the heart of what “solidarity”
means and how capacious it should be as a concept for those who study
labor. Imagining an expansive version of solidarity might speak to ties
among workers regardless of class—the bargaining or legal victory for
professional football players might redound to the beneﬁt of fast food
266. For more information about “Justice for Janitors,” see Stephen Lerner & Jono
Shaffer, 25 Years Later: Lessons from the Organizers of Justice for Janitors, Nation (June 16,
2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/25-years-later-lessons-from-the-organizersof-justice-for-janitors [https://perma.cc/M72E-XC8D].
267. See Sachs, Unbundled Union, supra note 13, at 168 n.83 (“As of March 2011,
approximately 85.8% of union members lived in households representing the lower nine
income deciles for U.S. households.”).
268. See, e.g., id. at 168–69 (collecting data on historical unionization rates and discussing how unions have organized for both lower- and middle-class workers).
269. See, e.g., Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and Political
Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1637, 1640
(2014) (describing how union membership may correlate with the growth of the middle
class).
270. See Liam Dillon, Here’s How Construction Worker Pay Is Dominating California’s
Housing Debate, L.A. Times (May 12, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sacconstruction-workers-housing-20170512-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/GD56-UBZ5];
David Ng, Hollywood Guilds Flex Their Muscle as Union Inﬂuence Declines Nationwide,
L.A. Times (May 9, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-hollywoodunions-20170509-story.html [https://perma.cc/6A7J-HMGZ] (“As union membership
continues to decline nationwide, Hollywood remains a bastion of organized labor, with
unions controlling nearly every aspect of production, including the director who calls
‘action’ and the truck drivers who transport equipment to and from sets. Their power can
bring the ﬁlm . . . industry to a standstill . . . .”); see also Sports Unions Work to Level the
Playing Field, Am. Postal Workers Union (June 30, 2009), https://apwu.org/news/sportsunions-work-level-playing-ﬁeld [https://perma.cc/3Y46-95DN] (“Although their average
salary is considerably higher and their ‘work year’ is much shorter, members of the nation’s
four major sports unions share much in common with their counterparts in other industries,
especially the historical basis for their creation: Poor wages and unfair working
conditions.”).
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workers. In contrast, narrowing the meaning of solidarity would get us
back to the distinctions described by Lukács—the rich organizing to
increase their salaries does little to help the plight of many poor workers.271
Indeed, perhaps if the public comes to associate “organized labor” only
with celebrities, then they will be less sympathetic to organized labor
generally and will come to view unions as inessential.
Whatever one’s views on the social beneﬁts of or theoretical case for
higher-wage unions, it’s important to recognize that arguments against
middle-class (or upper-class) unions cut much more broadly than discussions of police. So, for those who are skeptics of police unions as a result
of their relatively higher wages and social standing, the real question is
whether they would adopt similar critiques of autoworkers and other
middle-class unionized work forces.
D. Demographics and Politics
Finally, we might distinguish police unions along lines of member
politics and demographics. That is, as noted at the outset of the Essay,
police unions are more likely to swing right politically and may be more
heavily comprised of white men than some other public-sector unions,
such as teachers’ unions.272 For this distinction to have any teeth, though,
our belief in or defense of public-sector unions would need to rest on these
factors. If, for example, unionization were not viewed as a good in itself,
but were only desirable to the extent it beneﬁtted workers of color or
advanced liberal, progressive, or left politics, then we might be right to
look askance at a union that did none of those things. In other words, this
critique rests on a view that unionization is not a good in and of itself;
rather, unionization’s virtues are tied up in a particular understanding of
unions elevating the voices of left-leaning people and people of color.
While some union supporters might take that view, it is largely
ahistorical (or, at least, selectively accurate historically). Unions’ relationships to racial justice have been fraught. The image of unions heavily
comprised of people of color (particularly Latinx workers) is a relatively
recent one. Organized labor in the United States often butted heads with
racial justice advocates. While radical unions such as the Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW) embraced an explicitly antiracist agenda,273 more
mainstream unions have, from time to time, embraced or mobilized racist

271. See supra notes 231–237 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 172–177 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Peter Cole, Wobblies on the Waterfront: Interracial Unionism in
Progressive-Era Philadelphia 72 (2007); Howard Kimeldorf, Battling for American Labor:
Wobblies, Craft Workers, and the Making of the Union Movement 72 (1999) (describing
the Wobblies’ “color blind” approach to union organizing).
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and xenophobic policies in order to protect their members’ interests and
retain market control.274
Even when unions weren’t outright hostile to the ﬁght for racial
equality, they certainly weren’t always on the frontlines. The widely cited
Supreme Court case of Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization stands as but one marker of the fraught relationship between
unions and racial justice.275 In Emporium Capwell, several black workers at
a unionized San Francisco department store complained to union officials
that management was discriminating based on race.276 When workers
found the union’s response unsatisfactory, they picketed in an effort to
exert pressure on management.277 Eventually, when the workers refused
to stop picketing, they were ﬁred, leading to litigation.278 This reﬂected
“the crisis that liberalism found itself mired in at the end of the 1960s as it
sought to accommodate its constituents’ disparate visions of economic
equality and social fairness.”279 The union hadn’t adopted a position
explicitly opposed to racial justice or civil rights. Indeed, the union was
pursuing the workers’ grievances. But it had refused to embrace a more
radical vision that would have allowed workers to confront management
directly. The case, therefore, became:
[A] symbol of how labor unions have interacted with community
groups, often to the detriment of the movement itself. When
community groups have sought to involve themselves in unions,
they have found an ideology that is partly driven by law but partly
rooted in notions of hierarchy and the legal entitlement to
exclusively speak for workers.280
274. See, e.g., Philip S. Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619–1981, at
263 (1982) (describing at least one instance when Black steelworkers had been excluded
from leadership positions in a union); Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights
98–99 (2007) (describing union leaders’ failure to address discrimination against black
workers during the 1940s); Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American
Labor 73 (rev. and expanded ed., 2013) (“[W]hite working-class racism and craft-union
exclusion had made African Americans skeptical bystanders when it came to the fate of the
U.S. labor movement.”); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 Calif. L.
Rev. 1767, 1782 (2001) (“[O]rganized labor, and the working class more generally, came to
be associated with a conservative defense of the status quo and white male privilege.”). But
cf. Nelson Lichtenstein, A Contest of Ideas: Capital, Politics and Labor 109–29 (2013)
(tracking the fraught relationship between union officials and black workers’ ﬁght for civil
rights).
275. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
276. See id. at 52–54.
277. Id. at 55–56.
278. Id. at 56–57.
279. Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the Crisis of
Post-War Liberalism, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 129, 130 (2004).
280. Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the
U.S. Labor Movement, 54 Hastings L.J. 79, 128–29 (2002). But see Charlotte Garden &
Nancy Leong, “So Closely Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1135, 1149–51 (2013) (critiquing a reading of Emporium Capwell as emblematic of deeper
racism in organized labor).
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To be clear, the relationship between movements for worker power
and for racial justice resists easy classiﬁcation. “The labor movement” is—
and always has been—far from monolithic,281 and the same is true of
marginalized groups or movements for racial justice.282 Further, the
temptation to speak of “race,” “class,” and other identities as distinct
misstates the interconnectedness and interdependency of various hierarchies.283 Much ink has been spilled and competing narratives abound on
organized labor and race in the United States. Some commentators focus
on the ways that unions worked to exclude people of color from the labor
market,284 while others argue that unions have been an important vehicle
for civil rights.285 Rather than endorsing one narrative here, I simply mean
to emphasize that the question of unions and race is a complicated one.
Suggesting that the operative justiﬁcation for worker organizing or labor
law was to advance the interests of racial justice seems highly contestable.
So a critique of police unions that relies on an image of otherwise racially
unproblematic unionism is misguided or, at least, in need of much greater
281. See Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy,
and the Decline of Liberalism 2 (1998) (“Monographs on trade and others on labor,
business, civil rights, and politics also serve to keep history in discrete channels . . . . History
is impoverished.”); Marion Crain, Confronting the Structural Character of Working
Women’s Economic Subordination: Collective Action vs. Individual Rights Strategies, 3
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 26, 32–33 (1994) (“Notwithstanding the deplorable history of sexism
in the labor movement, unions are not monolithic.”).
282. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of
Identity 14 (Taylor & Francis e-Library ed. 2002) (“[W]omen are the sex which is not ‘one,’
but multiple.”); Angela Y. Davis, Women, Race and Class 110–26 (1981) (noting, amongst
other variances, how leaders in women’s suffrage diverged on how to confront racism within
their movement); Robinson, supra note 230, at 42–43; Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 588 (1990) (“Not surprisingly,
the story [feminist theory] tell[s] about ‘women,’ despite its claim to universality, seems to
black women to be peculiar to women who are white, straight, and socioeconomically
privileged . . . .”); bell hooks, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black 121 (1989)
(“[I]t is precisely the notion that there is a monolithic black community that must be
challenged.”).
283. See C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Touissaint L’Ouverture and the Santo
Domingo Revolution 283 (1963) (“The race question is subsidiary to the class question in
politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect the racial
factor as merely incidental [i]s an error only less grave than to make it fundamental.”).
284. See, e.g., Paul Frymer, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement,
and the Decline of the Democratic Party 1–8 (2008); Herbert Hill, Black Labor and the
American Legal System: Race, Work, and the Law 100–01 (1977) (“The legislation intended
to be the keystone of President Roosevelt’s program to protect and uplift the working class
had already become a millstone around the black worker’s neck . . . .”); Marion Crain,
Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 211, 213
(2002).
285. See, e.g., Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1313, 1341 (2002)
(embracing a vision of “race-conscious labor organizing”); Garden & Leong, supra note
280, at 1139 (“Like much conventional wisdom, the pervasive narratives describing unions
and people of color as rivals are ﬂawed.”); James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions
and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 Tex.
L. Rev. 889, 903 (1991).
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explanation. If organizations that in some way reinforced the interests of
(some version of) white masculinity or heteropatriarchy were inherently
problematic, then many other unions—both contemporary and historical—should be subject to similar criticism as police unions.
Similarly, unions have not been uniformly left, liberal, progressive, or
Democratic. Even if we (accurately) view unionization as an inherently left
project,286 unions have not uniformly embraced left political views or
supported left-leaning politicians. In his controversial, but well-received
history of the Teamsters, Thaddeus Russell argues that famed Teamsters
President Jimmy Hoffa’s success and leadership strategy owed much more
to his conservative views and support for right-inﬂected economic policies,
than it did to leftist solidarity.287 While Hoffa shared the same basic goal of
contemporary socialist and social-democratic labor leaders (i.e., “creating
a monopoly over the labor market”), Russell argues, Hoffa was motivated
not by “an ideology of worker communitarianism,” but rather “by nothing
more than the self-interest of an economic rationalist.”288 This isn’t to
suggest that Hoffa is emblematic of the U.S. labor movement.289 Instead, I
note Russell’s characterization of Hoffa as a means of illustrating the
multiplicity of ideals and ideologies that have deﬁned the U.S. labor
movement.
Historically, defenses of unionization have rested on an analysis
rooted in power: Without a union or a means of bargaining and acting
collectively, workers would exist at the whim of their bosses. This defense
could rely on a range of different ideological commitments: The Marxist
might argue that absent unions, labor would be powerless in the face of
capital;290 the syndicalist might argue that the union represents a superior
alternative to the state as a vehicle for representing the interests of the
people;291 for the New Deal liberal, the union is a necessary way of
protecting some modicum of equality, essential to the functioning of
286. That is, unions, by empowering workers and serving as a vehicle for collective voice
and collective bargaining, level the playing ﬁeld and alter the terms of an ongoing, systemic
conﬂict between labor and capital.
287. See Russell, Out of the Jungle, supra note 13, at 212.
288. Id. at 109.
289. Cf. Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States:
Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 385, 410 (2006) (“Unions cannot overcome
collective action problems by appeals to economic rationality. They must persuade potential
members and activists to redeﬁne their interests.” (footnote omitted)).
290. See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm, How to Change the World: Reﬂections on Marx and
Marxism 59 (2011); Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy 187–88 (Harry Quelch trans.,
Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1910) (1847); William E. Forbath, Habermas’s Constitution: A
History, Guide, and Critique, 23 Law & Soc. Inquiry 969, 977 n.8 (1998) (“Until World War
I, the Marxist Second International hewed to an evolutionary brand of Marxism that
emphasized the progressive role of capitalism’s countervailing institutions: trade unions and
working-class political parties.”).
291. See, e.g., Paul Avrich, Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in
America 318, 323 (1995); Michael Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy 90 (Marshall S. Shatz
ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (1873).
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democracy and a just society;292 and, even for the conservative or
libertarian the union might operate as an effective means of aggregating
worker interests and reaching optimal bargaining outcomes.293
To conclude that unions are defensible only in so far as they represent
a certain demographic or set of policy preferences would be to depart
from each of these traditional, broader justiﬁcations. Of course, there is
nothing wrong with departing from tradition.294 But it is worth noting that
such a defense of unionization would be a departure and might well
suggest a different model of the union—more as a political party than a
bargaining unit. Framed in its most generous (or radical) way, we might
see this vision as reﬂecting aspects of IWW-style ideological unionization—
i.e., unionization that reﬂected a broader political project or set of
commitments to class solidarity and political radicalism. Think here of the
call for one big union295 as a means for the forces of labor to engage in

292. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (“The inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association
substantially burdens and affects the ﬂow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions . . . .”); Cynthia Estlund, How the Workplace Constitution Ties
Liberals and Conservatives in Knots, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1139 (2015) (book review) (“In
effect, the NLRA created a metaphorical workplace constitution to extend the reach and
the values of the actual Constitution beyond the state action threshold.”).
293. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 116 (Univ. Chi. Press 1982)
(1962) (expressing opposition to right-to-work laws); Russell, Out of the Jungle, supra note
13, at 212 (“But to the Teamster rank and ﬁle, the government repression that ultimately
crushed [Hoffa’s] power made him a martyr for the fulﬁllment of their desires.”); Jack
Goldsmith, Conservative Support for Alt-Labor, OnLabor (Oct. 17, 2013), https://
onlabor.org/conservative-support-for-alt-labor [https://perma.cc/5ZZY-YG4X] (arguing
that conservatives and libertarians who value “freedom of contract” should be enthusiastic
about certain noncoercive forms of unionization and collective bargaining).
294. Indeed, there might be good reasons to think that older models of worker
organizing (and, certainly, older labor law frameworks) might have outlived their
usefulness. See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements,
95 Calif. L. Rev. 1879, 1891–98 (2007) (describing the role of worker centers in the
contemporary workers’ and immigrants’ rights movements); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny,
Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 561, 579–91 (2014); V.B.
Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassiﬁcation
Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 739, 801; Victor Narro,
Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los Angeles Worker
Centers, 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 465, 470–95 (2006); Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and
the Shift to a New Paradigm of Labor Law, 50 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 515, 517–30 (2006);
Rebecca J. Livengood, Note, Organizing for Structural Change: The Potential and Promise
of Worker Centers, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 325, 327–30 (2013).
295. See Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the
World 166 (2d ed. 1988); Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism: Criminal
Syndicalism Laws and the Industrial Workers of the World, 1917–1927, 85 Or. L. Rev. 649,
679 (2006) [hereinafter White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism] (identifying “the
strategic goal of IWW militancy” as “the eventual formation of ‘one big union’ embracing
all true workers and poised to use its gigantic size and tactical militancy to wrest ownership
and power from capitalists and from the capitalist state”).
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open economic warfare with the forces of capital.296 To supporters of a
more radical unionism, perhaps this model would represent a marked
improvement over the stale and “ossiﬁed” models of worker empowerment that are on their last legs.
But, there is a key difference between the radical unionist model and
the contemporary model: The former is rooted in a radical ideology that
identiﬁed class solidarity and empowerment as the end goals; the contemporary model appears to rest more on a set of liberal/progressive commitments that align more with a political party than a class or social group. To
the Wobblies,297 workers rising up and ﬁghting capital might well have
been an end in itself, or, at least, a means to a world in which labor had
overthrown or unseated capital. To the contemporary advocates for union
as political actor, the end appears to be electoral victory for Democrats or
progressive candidates and the attendant adoption of policies favored by
those candidates. Those policies certainly might beneﬁt working people
and might be better than the alternative. But it would be a stretch to argue
that the vision is similarly radical or transformative and/or that its
proponents are imagining a world in which the union might become the
relevant unit of social and political ordering. Or, maybe more accurately,
to some proponents of this vision, it might be deeply radical or transformative. Yet, unlike an IWW-style radical union model, the radicalism and
transformation are not explicitly grounded in class warfare and the
conﬂict between labor and capital.
IV. A PROBLEM OF UNIONS, OR A PROBLEM OF POLICING?
To the extent any or all of the distinctions discussed in the previous
Part resonate, perhaps we needn’t delve deeper into the distinction between
police unions and other public-sector unions. Perhaps there is a principled
theoretical distinction that might allow scholars and activists to endorse
stripping police of union rights while continuing to advocate for publicsector unions. Perhaps. But I’m not convinced.
Instead, in this Part, I argue that we might identify different strands
in the critical literature on police unions. The ﬁrst strand is, at its core, a
critique of public-sector unions. For a variety of reasons, police unions
might be a particularly objectionable form of public-sector union. But the
true vice of police unions is their very union-ness—the very properties

296. One way of understanding the rise (and failure) of U.S. labor law is as a
conservative or liberal legalist effort to prevent this more radical vision and the sorts of
“labor strife” or “labor unrest” that characterized Depression-era workplaces. See Karl E.
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 268 (1978) (discussing the “deradicalization
and incorporation of the working class by developments within the relatively autonomous
dimension of legal consciousness, legal institutions, and legal practice”); see also James B.
Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law 1–43 (1983).
297. Members of the IWW.
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discussed in Part II. The second strand actually has relatively little to say
about the unions themselves. Rather, this strand—ﬁnding perhaps its
strongest voice in the growing literature on police abolitionism—is at its
core a critique of police. Certainly, to these critics, police unions are objectionable. But they are objectionable because they represent a consolidation of otherwise- or already-illegitimate power. The problem is police.
Police unions are an important lever of power in policing reform. And,
given the challenges inherent in addressing judicial protections for police,
perhaps police unions are the right lever on which reformers should focus
their attention. But unionization is, in some sense, a distraction from the
fundamental problem—police. This Part addresses these two strands in
turn.
A.

Anti-Unionism or Narrow Pro-Unionism

First, we might understand the prevalent critiques of police unions as
reﬂecting a deeper hostility to public-sector unions, or simply a relatively
narrow vision of unions’ social value.
1. Anti-Unionism. — Looking at the parallels outlined in Part II, the
critiques of police unions start to appear quite sweeping. Rather than a
narrow critique geared toward a particularly problematic profession, they
operate as a theoretical framework for a broader assault on (public-sector)
organized labor. Consider the two classes of critique identiﬁed in Part I:
the obstructionist critique and the political critique. Not coincidentally,
these critiques serve as the rejection of Freeman and Medoff’s “monopoly
face” and “collective voice/institutional response face.”298 Critics have
identiﬁed “what unions do” and concluded that unions do more harm
than good. The self-serving qualities of unionization elevate the voices of
some over the voices of others, subordinating the “public interest” to the
private interests of the workers.299
That is, perhaps the problem with police unions is not something
exceptional or unique to this one class of unions. In trying to suss out the
distinction between police unions and other types of unions, perhaps what
actually comes through is that some critics actually might be hostile to the
unionization process or the role of organizing workers. Through this lens,
the “voice” function allows for an outsized political footprint. The case of
police unions stands as a particularly glaring example because of their
298. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 151, at 5–6, 13.
299. See, e.g., Leo Troy, The New Unionism in the New Society: Public Sector Unions
in the Redistributive State 103–06 (1994) (“But not only are there [] differences, in fact,
there are conﬂicts of interests between the external philosophies of the New and the Old
Unionism, even though the clash is not publicly acknowledged.”); Fox, supra note 183, at
259 (“A governmental body that bargains with a union gives up some of its power to decide
public matters, and to this extent, illegally delegates its power.”); Robert S. Summers, Public
Sector Collective Bargaining Substantially Diminishes Democracy, 1 Gov’t Union Rev. 5, 5–
6 (1980) (arguing that public-sector unionism “inherently diminishes” and is the “very
antithesis” of democracy).

2020]

POLICE UNIONS

1389

electoral inﬂuence and success in extracting concessions from local
governments.300 And if unions’ “monopoly” function hampers proper functioning of industry and stymies reform, the police unions—again—serve as
Exhibit A for this dysfunction. Or, put differently, if one embraces these
critiques, police unions aren’t unique, some objectionable mutation of an
otherwise desirable social institution. Rather, police unions demonstrate
all that’s wrong with the unionization project.
2. Narrow Pro-Unionism. — One needn’t oppose worker organizing
outright to harbor some ambivalence about unions. A general preference
for unions certainly might give way when faced with competing values.301
More instrumental visions of unionism might allow for opposition to
unionization that fails to serve the desired ends. Ambivalence could take
many forms that might bear on police unions. But, here, I focus on an
ambivalence rooted in a concern about too much collective power. This
concern is hardly new. Indeed, a historicized treatment of U.S. labor law
must grapple with the deep uncertainty about worker power that has
deﬁned even the most pro-union moments in labor law’s development.
Despite a common view that scholars and commentators on the left view
unionization as an unqualiﬁed good, there’s good reason to believe that
the reality is much more complicated.
The history of U.S. organized labor might be understood as reﬂecting
a cycle, or perhaps a ﬂuctuation, between two poles: (1) a societal concern
that organizing workers had too little power and needed protections so
they could defend themselves against capital, and (2) a societal concern
that organizing workers had too much power and were endangering the
proper operation of the economy and causing third-party harms. We can
see labor law as it has evolved as reﬂecting those concerns, vacillating
between expanding and restricting workers’ rights.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, legal and
political elites perceived organizing workers as a threat to industry and the
nation’s ﬂedgling economy, so organizing workers were prosecuted under
the “labor conspiracy” doctrine.302 Labor law was criminal law, and
unionization was a crime.303 Fast forward a century, and public opinion
300. See Harmon, Problem of Policing, supra note 12, at 813–14 (“State executives,
legislators, and judges are all likely inﬂuenced by police unions and officer associations.”).
301. As Marcia McCormick notes, “[S]ome supporters of public sector bargaining
accept this view that [it] may subvert the public interest and be antidemocratic, but justify
any danger of antidemocratic effect by the fact that without it, pressure from the public will
always prevail to keep wages and beneﬁts for public employees at exploitative levels.”
McCormick, supra note 12, at 55.
302. See, e.g., Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American
Republic 114–16 (1993); Marjorie S. Turner, The Early American Labor Conspiracy Cases:
Their Place in Labor Law: A Reinterpretation 4 (1967); Levin, American Gangsters, supra
note 186, at 120.
303. See, e.g., Old Dominion Steam-Ship Co. v. McKenna, 30 F. 48, 50 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1887) (describing unionization as pro tanto illegal); People v. Cooper (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess.
1836), reprinted in 4 A Documentary History of American Industrial Society 277, 279 (John
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had shifted. In the years before the rise of the New Deal and the passage
of the NLRA, violence against organizing workers captivated the public
imagination.304 With a nation struggling to make ends meet, capital became
a villain in much mass culture, and workers seeking to earn a decent wage
garnered greater sympathy.305 Certainly, there was still signiﬁcant fear of
labor radicalism and the “wrong type” of unions, but the increasingly
accepted public narrative was one of powerful bosses exploiting powerless
workers.306 So, the NLRA and modern labor law were born.
Despite the effusive rhetoric that accompanied the passage of the
NLRA, the pendulum once again swung: Within ten years of the Act’s
passage, Congress passed the Taft–Hartley Act, which dramatically
restricted the power of unions.307 As the wartime economy blossomed and
organized labor grew further entrenched in the manufacturing sector,
industrial pushback became fierce. Unions were interfering with the smooth
functioning of the economy, opponents claimed, and they were acting as
R. Commons, Ulrich B. Phillips, Eugene A. Gilmore, Helen L. Sumner & John B. Andrews
eds., 1910) (“[Defendants] had not a right to meet together and to ﬁx those prices [for an
increase in wages] by combination—they had no right to say that boss shoemakers should
not employ men not belonging to their society.”); Commonwealth v. Grinder (Pa. Rec’s Ct.
1836), reprinted in A Documentary History of American Industrial Society, supra, at 335,
336 (“[W]hile the law permits [a worker] to value his own services at his arbitrary will . . . it
does not sanction the combination of two or more individuals, who unite for the purpose
of obtaining those wages, and of compelling others to join them . . . .”); William E. Forbath,
The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1166 (1989) (“[I]n
some early Gilded Age cases, courts refused to grant [labor] injunctions because the suits .
. . properly belonged in criminal court.”); Wythe Holt, Labor Conspiracy Cases in the
United States, 1805–1842: Bias and Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication, 22
Osgoode Hall L.J. 591, 592–97 (1984) (describing the early criminalization of organized
labor action as “conspiracy”); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Labor Law, 37 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Lab. L. 43, 50–55 (2016); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike,
and Other Tales, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 518, 521 (2004) (quoting a 1937 Supreme Court opinion
that referred to a sit-down strike as “an illegal seizure of the buildings in order to prevent
their use by the employer in a lawful manner” (quoting NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939))).
304. See Forbath, Distributive Constitution, supra note 133, at 1128.
305. See generally Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American
Culture in the Twentieth Century (1997) (tracing the symbiotic relationship between
organized labor and mass culture in the lead up to the New Deal).
306. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346
(1944) (“Collective bargaining was not deﬁned by the [Railway Labor Act of 1926] which
provided for it, but it generally has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval
to the philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United
States.”); Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion
of New Deal Labor Law, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 275, 276 (2004) (“The [NLRA] was
by no means fundamentally radical; it did not in any way portend the destruction of private
property, wage labor, or capitalism. At the same time, the [NLRA] was a remarkably
progressive legal document, consistent with a genuinely reformist vision of labor
relations.”).
307. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1947) (arguing that Taft–Hartley “represent[ed] an abandonment of the
policy of affirmatively encouraging the spread of collective bargaining”).
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extortionate forces, exacting unreasonable rents from employers. Add to
that the Red Scare and elision of unions with Communism, and the union
was no longer the powerless entity in need of the state’s protections.
Instead, the specter of real union power proved intimidating, leading to
the passage of Taft–Hartley and the Labor Management Relations Act,
which helped “deradicalize” U.S. labor law and defang unions.308
These shifts in public opinion and legal protections have continued
in the ensuing decades, even as federal labor law has stagnated or “ossified.”309
The Reagan-era decimation of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization (PATCO) was rooted in framing the workers as exerting too
much power—effectively exerting the power to grind travel to a halt.310
Similarly, shifting perceptions of unions as corrupt or “captured” by
organized crime led to prosecutions and governmental control of some
locals.311 And, as discussed above, teachers’ unions have been public
villains, decried by many, when they were viewed as using their power to
the detriment of vulnerable students.312 When seen as the powerless
victims of austerity and harsh politicians, though, sympathies (at least on
the political left) swung back.
This is, of course, a grossly oversimpliﬁed account of centuries of U.S.
labor history. But it is meant to illustrate a basic point: Worker power (not
“workers’ rights” or “worker dignity”) has historically prompted fear,
concern, and a dialing back of legal protections. Worker power is often
referred to romantically or idealistically as an unqualiﬁed good,313 but
308. See, e.g., Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft–Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 763, 765 (1998) (describing how the Taft–Hartley Act reﬂected a conﬂict over a much
larger social and political clash of ideologies in the New Deal political economy); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale L.J. 1509, 1511–
17 (1981); cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law
Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L.J.
2013, 2034–35 (2014) (examining the scholarly debate about whether and to what extent
the NLRA was ever radicalized and, hence, was ever deradicalized by the Taft–Hartley Act).
309. See generally Estlund, The Ossiﬁcation of American Labor Law, supra note 71
(arguing that U.S. labor law has become outmoded and has ceased to adapt to changing
politics and market conditions).
310. See Joseph A. McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic
Controllers, and the Strike that Changed America 6–14 (2011) (tracking the politics and
public perception of the 1981 strike by PATCO members); Fox, supra note 183, at 308
(describing how even those who later urged President Reagan to pardon PATCO workers
adopted President Reagan’s narrative and acknowledged the strong public support for his
actions).
311. See generally Kenneth C. Crowe, Collision: How the Rank and File Took Back the
Teamsters (1993) (tracing the history of corruption in the Teamsters, and the role of federal
law enforcement); James B. Jacobs & Kerry T. Cooperman, Breaking the Devil’s Pact: The
Battle to Free the Teamsters from the Mob (2011) (describing governmental scrutiny of the
Teamsters from the mid-1980s to the 2000s).
312. See supra section II.B.
313. See, e.g., Andrias, An American Approach, supra note 120, at 706 (describing “New
Dealers” as seeking to “build[] worker power and a more egalitarian political economy”).
Some have problematized the idea of “power” exerted by labor forces, highlighting its
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when worker power has been wielded, it hasn’t necessarily been met with
resounding support, particularly from liberals or progressives.314
There has long been a deep undercurrent in labor law, its public
understanding, and its scholarly treatments that views unionization as a
good—to a point. Unions might be important for many reasons, but as an
aggregation of collective power, they also can be dangerous. This undercurrent relies on a view that unions serve as a counterbalance to the forces
of capital; but when unions obtain too much power they may be as
dangerous as capital or aggregations of corporate power. From industrial
sabotage to the secondary boycott, unions might not advance liberal ideals
or promote social stability.315 Courts have treated exercises of union power
as possibly portending “general class war.”316 And lawmakers and commentators often frame union power as rooted in the actual or threatened
exercise of force.317 Despite labor’s long path to legitimacy from the days
of the nineteenth-century conspiracy prosecutions, the specter of violence
haunts the rhetorical and legal landscape of labor regulation.318
subjective and relational nature. See Rogers, Passion and Reason in Labor Law, supra note
156, at 359 (“Organizing is not just a process of building support for the union . . . , but also
a process of building worker power and organization through collective action. Power . . . is
not a thing or . . . quantity, but ‘an ongoing interplay of strategic maneuvering between
partners,’ and it is partially constitutive of individual subjectivity.” (quoting Steven L.
Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 Va. L. Rev. 721, 818–19 (1996))).
314. But see Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1379, 1390 (1993) [hereinafter Barenberg,
Wagner Act] (“My reconstruction of Wagner’s progressivism disputes the conventional
assumption that New Deal labor policy rested on an ‘adversarial’ view of labor-management
relations.”).
315. See, e.g., Hiba Haﬁz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 1845, 1850
(2018) (describing the historical use of and opposition to secondary boycotts); David M.
Rabban, The IWW Free Speech Fights and Popular Conceptions of Free Expression Before
World War I, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1055, 1062 (1994) (“IWW talk of class conﬂict, sabotage, and
revolution, in deliberately outrageous language mocking government and religion, fed
public concerns about labor unrest, anarchist violence, and the deterioration of traditional
values.”); White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism, supra note 295, at 687 (“[T]he
concept of sabotage . . . was central to IWW ideology and propaganda, and . . . reﬂected very
clearly the union’s resistance to accelerating attempts by employers to assert totalitarian
control in the workplace.”).
316. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 472 (1921); cf. Am. Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 205 (1921) (“The name ‘picket’
indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion.”).
317. See, e.g., Gary Minda, Boycott in America: How Imagination and Ideology Shape
the Legal Mind 42–47 (1999); Marion Crain & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1791, 1817 (“Although some labor protests did involve actual violence, judicial
decisions in those cases often invoked sweeping condemnations of labor picketing itself.”).
318. See, e.g., David Witwer, Shadow of the Racketeer: Scandal in Organized Labor 241
(2009) (describing “the shadow of the racketeer, a menacing depiction of organized labor’s
power that antiunion forces invoked throughout the postwar era”); Eisenhower Insists on
End of Blackmail Picket Lines, Chi. Trib., Aug. 7, 1959, at 5 (quoting President Eisenhower
as advocating for “a law to protect the American people from the gangsters, racketeers, and
other corrupt elements who have invaded the labor-management ﬁeld”).
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Which is to say that a certain squeamishness about powerful unions
hardly should be surprising. Despite the repeated insistence from police
union members and police union opponents that police unions are
different,319 police unions may just be another example of unions in their
unpopular form: cartels, bullies, or distasteful manifestations of collective
power. Indeed, in his work on police unions, David Sklansky has suggested
that the problem with policing reform isn’t unions as such.320 Rather, it is
that police unionism reﬂects a particular oppositional vision of organized
labor.321 This argument is common in much literature on labor law
reform322—that a less oppositional model would be better for labor and
capital.323 But it is worth noting that such an argument runs directly
counter to a long history of radical unionism and accounts of worker
power that rest on a vision of unions as a means of ﬁghting an economic
war against capital.324
To be clear, support for unionization that is less than categorical need
not reﬂect a liberal vision of unions. Such qualiﬁcations instead might
come from a radical posture and provide valuable nuance to left accounts
of labor primacy. Some narrow pro-unionism might properly be understood as a resistance to conservative unionism. But that critique can and
should cut more broadly than a skepticism about police unions. From a
more radical perspective, post-NLRA unionism has always been limited as
a vehicle for transformative class politics.325 It may be that aspects of the
319. See DeLord & York, supra note 62, at 11–18 (discussing the differences between
“police unions and all other public and private sector unions”); supra Part III.
320. See Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 28, at 180–88.
321. See id.
322. Sklansky does suggest that his argument should be cabined because “the best
model for workplace democracy in policing may differ . . . from traditional trade unionism.”
Id. at 180–81.
323. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 953 (1994)
(describing successful case studies of participatory management); Van Wezel Stone, supra
note 156, at 168–72.
324. This is not to say that radical unionists or left labor scholars have always rejected
cooperative management structures out of hand. See Karl E. Klare, The Labor–
Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 39, 50 (1988) (“[W]orkplace democracy and economic prosperity alike require new
forms of work organization combining adversary and participatory assumptions, institutions
and practices.”). But a cooperative, rather than oppositional, approach risks repurposing
unions as an asset for capital, either crowding out more radical, worker-representative
unions, or legitimating employers’ practices and decisionmaking. As Veena Dubal puts it,
“Instead of curtailing the power of capital, they would extend it.” Veena Dubal, Solidarity
Unionism v. Company Unionism in the Gig Economy, Law & Pol. Econ. (June 18, 2019),
https://lpeblog.org/2019/06/18/solidarity-unionism-v-company-unionism-in-the-gigeconomy/#more-2535 [https://perma.cc/G37M-2QCP].
325. See Stanley Aronowitz, Introduction to Working Class Hero, at xv (1983)
(“Even when the CIO mobilized millions of industrial workers in the 1930’s or during the
explosion of public sector unionism in the 1960’s, labor . . . did not emerge with a new
strategy capable of making the most of gains at both the organizational and political
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police union critique resonate with those more moderate, neoliberal, or
technocratic approaches. Yet, some of the arguments advanced—think of
those sounding in class solidarity326—might reﬂect a broader critique of
U.S. unionism as conservative, insufficiently radical, and actually divorced
from the ideological and tactical radicalism that have deﬁned the IWW
and a range of left unions.
Taking this more radical, narrow unionism as a guide might lead to a
range of spaces increasingly explored by labor law scholars: the move away
from exclusive representation, non-union models of organization, and the
rise of left alt-labor. Notably, such a turn to alt-labor actually resonates with
some accounts of police unions. Fisk and Richardson, for example, end up
endorsing a vision of members-only or minority unionism as a way of
promoting intradepartmental change.327 Minority unionism has long
enjoyed support in certain corners of the labor law literature—rather than
embracing an exclusive bargaining model, whereby a majority of workers
elect a union and that union must represent all of the bargaining unit, a
minority-union model might allow for a multiplicity of unions in a given
shop.328 Workers only would be represented by the union if they voted to
be.329 To Fisk and Richardson, this approach might allow for dissenting
voices (particularly black officers) to advance policies that might be less
regressive than those currently associated with police unions.330
Of course, such an approach rests on a view that current union
positions don’t represent rank-and-ﬁle preferences (or, at least, the preferences of signiﬁcant portions of unionized officers).331 Even for those more
skeptical about the potential for changing police from within, this
approach might speak to ways in which police unions are emblematic of
levels.”); cf. Barenberg, Wagner Act, supra note 314, at 1390 (“[Senator Robert] Wagner’s
quasi-utopian mission was to ‘build[] . . . a co-operative order’ designed to reintegrate a
class-riven society and to replace or at least legitimate asymmetric power relations.” (quoting
Robert Wagner, Address on NBC Radio: Industry and Labor 6 (Oct. 18, 1933) (transcript
available in The Robert Wagner Papers, Georgetown University, at 600 SF 103, Folder 28))).
326. See supra section III.B.
327. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 720–21.
328. See generally Charles J. Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic
Rights in the American Workplace (2005); Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing Union Democracy:
Labor Law, Bureaucracy, and Workplace Association, 88 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1, 30–32 (2010)
(arguing that exclusive representation “precludes an employer from bargaining with a
minority union”); Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work
Law, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 857, 868 (2014) (“[W]hatever the arguments for members-only
bargaining in non-right-to-work states, there are substantially stronger arguments for the
Board to conclude that section 8(a)(5) [of the NLRA] requires members-only bargaining
in right-to-work states.”).
329. See Morris, supra note 328, at 184.
330. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 721.
331. Cf. Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 28, at 180–82 (noting potential
beneﬁts of rank-and-ﬁle-led reforms, while also arguing that “multivalent organizing and
management-led exercises in participatory decision making could help to change the shape
of police unionism”).
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other faults in the labor movement and the dominant model of unionism.
That is, top–down governance, conservative approaches, and resistance to
change might be seen as costs of the accepted model of unionism, even
for scholars who believe in the importance of unionism as a means of
vindicating workers’ interests.
B.

Anti-Policism

Alternatively, we might understand the critiques of police unions as
actually having little to do with unions, organized labor, or the relationship
between workers and bosses. Maybe the problem isn’t police unions; maybe
the problem is police. Such a critique resonates with a growing literature and
activism that embraces police abolition or the general abolition of the
carceral state.332 The abolitionist account, like other totalizing critiques of
the criminal system,333 tends to take as its starting point that the institutions
and structures of criminal law are rotten to their core.334
From an abolitionist perspective, everything about the carceral state—
from lawmaking, to policing, to the institutions of punishment—is oppressive

332. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, Summer Heat, New Inquiry (June 8, 2015),
https://thenewinquiry.com/summer-heat [https://perma.cc/7VMA-4BJY] (outlining steps
toward police abolition); José Martín, Policing is a Dirty Job, but Nobody’s Gotta Do It: 6 Ideas
for a Cop-Free World, Rolling Stone (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/politics-news/policing-is-a-dirty-job-but-nobodys-gotta-do-it-6-ideas-for-a-cop-freeworld-199465/#ixzz3MAjhe2IM [https://perma.cc/MGK8-8TW3] (highlighting alternatives to
policing); Purnell, supra note 107 (“Oppressed people must give up the systems that harm
them. Police are not public, nor good . . . . Police officers are prison–industrial complex
foot soldiers, and poor people are its targets.”); Alex S. Vitale, What Does It Mean to Be
Anti-Police?, Nation (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/what-does-itmean-be-anti-police [https://perma.cc/LZK7-8Z5E] [hereinafter Vitale, What Does It
Mean] (“Every time a community calls for more police to solve their crime and disorder
problems, it is re-empowering . . . a[n] . . . ideology that is, at root, demeaning to poor
people and dismissive of the ability of the state to use social programs and market
interventions to empower and reinvigorate communities.”).
333. See, e.g., Butler, The System Is Working, supra note 111, at 1456–57 (arguing that
the system, rather than being “broken” is “working the way it is supposed to”—to harm and
control poor people of color); Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice
Reform, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 259, 262–63 (2018) [hereinafter Levin, The Consensus Myth]
(describing this “mass” or phenomenological critique of the criminal system); McLeod,
Prison Abolition, supra note 250, at 1161–62 (arguing that prison abolition is warranted to
overturn core systemic discriminations in the criminal justice system); Roberts, supra note
99, at 1604–05 (illustrating how criminal law “enforce[s] an undemocratic racial caste
system originating in slavery”).
334. See, e.g., Maya Dukmasova, Abolish the Police? Organizers Say It’s Less Crazy than
It Sounds, Chi. Reader (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/policeabolitionist-movement-alternatives-cops-chicago/Content?oid=23289710 [https://perma.cc/XX
F4-S7V7] (collecting statements by abolitionist activists); Kaba, supra note 332 (“By rhetorically constructing the criminal punishment system as ‘broken,’ reform is reaffirmed and
abolition is painted as unrealistic and unworkable. Those of us who maintain that reform is
actually impossible within the current context are positioned as unreasonable and naïve.”).
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and geared toward the maintenance of social and economic inequality.335
Policing as an institution cannot be divorced from white supremacy,
massive disparities in income, and a long history of state and private
violence against marginalized communities. As sociologist Alex Vitale
argues, “Modern policing is largely a war on the poor that does little to
make people safer or communities stronger, and even when it does, this is
accomplished through the most coercive forms of state power that destroy
the lives of millions.”336 And abolitionist activist Mariame Kaba argues that
“[o]n the way to abolition, we can take a number of intermediate steps to
shrink the police force and to restructure our relationships with each
other.”337 For Kaba, one of those “intermediate steps” is “abolishing police
unions.”338
If one adopts an abolitionist frame, police unions certainly may be
objectionable. Police unions serve the ends of their members (i.e., police),
and they enhance the political power of police officers.339 So police unions
might well be an appropriate target as a lever of power: Policies might
improve with a greater (or continued) focus on undermining the interests
of police unions. From this radical perspective, though, the unions are
objectionable only in that they advance or entrench the power and
interests of police. Absent a liberal reformist vision of policing, unions are
not serving to prevent the proper mode or style of policing.340 If one takes
a liberal legalist approach, police unions are particularly odious because
335. See, e.g., Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance,
Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1684, 1686 (2019) (“Abolition
calls on us not only to destabilize, deconstruct, and demolish oppressive systems, institutions,
and practices, but also to repair histories of harm across the board.”); Allegra M. McLeod,
Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1617 (2019) [hereinafter
McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy] (“Contemporary movements for penal
abolition—building on a longstanding body of abolitionist writing and theory—have
embraced both a negative or deconstructive project of dismantling penal systems and a
positive project of world-building.”); Fred Moten & Stefano Harney, The University and the
Undercommons: Seven Theses, 22 Soc. Text 101, 114 (2004) (describing abolition as “the
abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the
wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the
founding of a new society”); Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A
Foreword, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1575, 1576 (2019) (“The long historical praxis of abolition is
grounded in a Black radical genealogy of revolt and transformative insurgency against racial
chattel enslavement and the transatlantic trafficking of captive Africans.”).
336. Vitale, The End of Policing, supra note 107, at 53–54.
337. Kaba, supra note 332.
338. Id.; see also Vitale, What Does It Mean, supra note 332.
339. See Zoorob, supra note 102, at 247–49 (using evidence from “campaign events,
data on police political behavior, and vote shares to make the case that widespread
organizational networks may have been critical” to Trump’s 2016 election).
340. Cf. Eric J. Miller, Breaking Windows as Corrective Justice: Impure Resistance in
Urban Ghettos, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 313, 315 (2018) (“If racial ghettos ought not exist, as a
normative matter, then we ought not be satisﬁed with technocratic and consequentialist
solutions to the ‘problem’ of the ghetto that stop short of ending it. Tolerating ghettos
requires either ignoring the question of their continued existence or justifying it.”).
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they interfere with procedural justice and the sorts of institutional checks
that might allow for good police governance. But if one rejects the claims
of the liberal legalist by claiming that “community policing” or “democratic
policing” are misnomers, then the critique of police unions necessarily
morphs.341
I don’t mean to suggest that police abolitionists or other radical commentators are wrong to critique police unions. Again, these unions are
critical players in debates about policing policy. Any activism to combat
abusive policing or assert community self-determination necessarily runs
up against the power of police unions. A failure to grapple with police
unions would lead back to problematically court-centric accounts of police
regulation and social change. But it’s important to understand how a
radical critique differs from a liberal one.342 Certainly, police unions remain
an object of hostility as a cipher for institutional power. Yet, from a radical
perspective, the police union is objectionable because of the core function
of its members, not because it is impeding the proper functioning of good
governance. Nor is the problem that police officers are speaking or
bargaining collectively.343 Additionally, where some liberal and progressive
commentators have suggested that police unions might be reformed or
repurposed to spur reform,344 the abolitionist critique rejects such a claim
out of hand: The sort of internal discipline or reexamination that a
progressive police union might offer certainly would be an improvement
over the status quo, but the unionized officers (even if they are more
racially diverse or sympathetic to policing critiques) probably still would
be committed to preserving their jobs and the institution of the police.
341. See Kaba, supra note 332 (rejecting the frame that suggests that the system is
“broken” or must be ﬁxed).
342. See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Foreword to Dan Berger, The Struggle Within: Prisons,
Political Prisoners, and Mass Movements in the United States, at vii, vii–viii (2014) (“The
distinction sketched out above is the difference between reformist reform—tweak
Armageddon—and non-reformist reform—deliberate change that does not create more
obstacles in the larger struggle.”); Akbar, supra note 26, at 410–13 (distinguishing between
liberal, legalist reforms and radical, movement-oriented ones); Levin, The Consensus Myth,
supra note 333, at 265–74 (mapping the theoretical and practical distinctions between
different degrees of criminal justice critique).
343. Cf. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 160, at 1076 (“Leaving aside the obvious fact
that the blame for punitive criminal sentencing laws and lousy public schools should be laid
at the door of many people and organizations beyond unionized guards and teachers, the
problem is not the employees through their union acting as a group . . . .”).
344. See, e.g., Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 28, at 180–88 (proposing
a “rank-and-ﬁle” participation model to increase workplace democracy for police officers);
Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 721–22 (advocating that the law governing police labor
relations implement a proposed form of “minority-unionism”); McCormick, supra note 12,
at 60–62 (“Unions bring more to the table, however. They can help craft and implement
solutions that will be more effective to reform police culture and change officer behavior.”);
Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions, supra note 17, at 95–96 (“The neglect of police
unions has seriously impeded understanding of American policing, particularly with respect
to basic police management, innovation and reform, police–community relations, and
police accountability.”).
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Arguing against police unions as an abolitionist, then, resembles the
paciﬁst’s decision to vote against military appropriations or veterans’
beneﬁts: The decision reﬂects little about the speciﬁc policy or the relevant
employee-beneﬁts-style analysis; rather, opposition reﬂects a deeper,
principled rejection of the legitimacy of the institution. Maybe police
deserve higher pay and better parental leave. Or maybe they don’t. But if
you don’t believe that police should have a job in the ﬁrst place, these
questions are moot.
I ﬁnd this to be a theoretically defensible argument. And, in a discussion of the proper allocation of resources for advocacy and activism, this
argument is important and compelling: Why focus on the rights of police
when so many other workers are relatively powerless? Indeed, taking the
military analogy a step further, one might ask (as some queer, left critics
have) why antimilitarists should be focused on the rights of queer people
to ﬁght for the state if ﬁghting for the state is inherently objectionable.345
To be clear, therefore, I am not suggesting that abolitionists should
embrace police unions. Nor, as a general matter, does this Essay endorse
a particular strategy for advocates. But I think that abolitionists committed
to worker power and a broader, worker-centered vision of radical left
politics should approach police unions with at least some ambivalence. Or,
at the very least, given the public-sector union parallels Part II highlights,
prolabor abolitionists should be wary of embracing many anti-police-union
arguments.
First, attacking police by arguing for stripping organizing rights legitimates anti-union arguments. Adopting these arguments when faced with
an unattractive industry or objectionable union helps bolster a set of
arguments against unions in all cases, or at the very least in cases when
workers perform controversial labor.346 That is, using the stripping of labor
rights as a vehicle to combat an industry or to advance policy goals legitimates such a move in other industries or contexts—notably industries and
contexts that tend to have a very different political valence.347 Dismantling
345. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics,
and the Limits of Law 142 (2011) (“[S]upport for gay and lesbian military service, and the
ending of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ allowed for a portrayal of the US military as a site of freedom
and equality, which is a useful distraction from the realities of its brutality.”).
346. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: Fin de Siècle 236–63
(1997); Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an
Investigation), in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays 85, 85–126 (Ben Brewster trans.,
2001 ed. 1971); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122
Yale L.J. 2176, 2189 (2013); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reﬂections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv.
L. Rev. 355, 429–32 (1995). See generally Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci 581 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
347. See generally Fischl, Running the Government, supra note 23, at 40 (“The attack
on public-sector unions thus threatens to exacerbate what is already a breathtaking
‘democracy deﬁcit’ in U.S. labor relations and—should the effort gain traction and
succeed—to cut American workers altogether out of a role in workplace governance.”).
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the abusive power structures of the state certainly stands as an abolitionist
goal, but turning to the logic(s) of neoliberalism to dismantle them seems
like a risky proposition, particularly if one endorses a vision of abolition as
a positive project—as rooted in building a new set of noncarceral social
and political institutions.348
Second, stripping organizing rights or eliminating unions wouldn’t
necessarily return power to “the people” or “the community.” As noted
above, most relevant policy determinations simply would revert to local
governments.349 So a critique of police unions that isn’t coupled with a
deeper critique of governance would do little to shift the balance of power:
Local governments have signed off on the CBAs that prevent police
accountability and endorse objectionable use-of-force rules, so why should
we trust those same government actors to produce better police governance or to embrace abolitionist politics in the absence of heavy union
involvement?
Indeed, radical or abolitionist critiques of police and the carceral
system as a whole tend to rest on a critique of the current structures of
representative democracy. Even deeply nonradical critiques of the criminal system tend to argue that the carceral state represents the apotheosis
of a massive democratic failure.350 But, to abolitionists, there is little solace
in arguments that current criminal law and criminal policy are the result
of legislative decisionmaking or somehow reﬂect the popular, democratic
will. The problem with police unions from an abolitionist perspective
really is a problem with the ability to dismantle the structures of modern
policing. Currently, unions stand guard over those structures, but so too
do the elected officials who capitulate to union demands and sacriﬁce
community will on the altar of political expediency. Reducing these
problems to a critique of union power would effectively let politicians off
the hook and would suggest that management—the same management

348. See, e.g., Angela Y. Davis, Abolition Democracy 96 (2005) (“In thinking speciﬁcally
about the abolition of prisons using the approach of abolition democracy, we would propose
the creation of an array of social institutions that would begin to solve the social problems
that set people on the track to prison, thereby helping to render the prison obsolete.”);
McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, supra note 335, at 1617 (describing a “positive
project of world building”).
349. See supra section II.B. Further, CBAs and police unions are hardly the only legal
institutions that interfere with police accountability. See Harmon, Problem of Policing,
supra note 12, at 799–800 (“Moreover, the legal context in which departments operate is
not static. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (‘ADEA’) initially applied
only to private employers but was amended to protect local government employees,
including police officers, in 1974.”).
350. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich. L. Rev. 505, 510 (2001) (arguing that “the story of American criminal law is a story of
tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom beneﬁts from more
and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for
narrower liability rules rather than broader ones”).
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that has presided over contemporary police practices—should be allowed
to emerge relatively unscathed.
CONCLUSION
For scholars and activists concerned about mass incarceration, there’s
a lot not to like about police unions. There is a great deal of work to be
done in better understanding police unions, their legal and political role,
and their place in broader reformist or radical projects. Emphasizing the
role of police unions reﬂects a welcome departure from court-centric and
formalistic treatments of policing. Appreciating the role of unions in the
criminal system reﬂects an important turn to grapple with the political
economy of criminal law and to take seriously the incentives and institutions that have helped to undergird the carceral state.
Ultimately, I don’t disagree with the critiques of police unions prevalent in the literature. As a descriptive matter, they certainly are right:
Police unions have fought to shield their members from public scrutiny
and legal accountability. And police unions repeatedly have rallied behind
politicians hostile to criminal justice reform, racial justice, and labor
rights. But embracing these critiques uncritically would be a mistake, yet
another example of a broad tendency to treat criminal law as exceptional
and divorced from important conversations about labor politics, worker
power, and the social and political fabric of society.
By encouraging a nuanced and critical examination of police unions
and their ﬂaws, I hope to suggest that there are major lessons to takeaway
for both labor and policing scholars. For scholars of labor law, recognizing
the shortcomings of police unions should contribute to a broader
reckoning with the vision of labor power and with the theoretical
justiﬁcations of labor law. Is the imagined “good” union one that actually
doesn’t exert too much power? Are the politics at the heart of pro-union
scholarship reliant on radical notions of class solidarity or on
liberal/progressive pragmatism designed to increase the relative strength
of the Democratic Party or its political analogs? As Fisk and Richardson
have argued, perhaps we might see in police unions a strong case for a
shift toward “minority” unions that could advance the interest of
dissenting voices within a police force.351 And, perhaps such a lesson can
be extended—to the extent that police unions represent the epitome of
the “bad kind” of unionism,352 perhaps the critiques of police unions can
contribute to a growing literature that seeks to envision new modes of
worker organizing outside of the NLRA model of exclusive bargaining.
That is, recognizing “what’s wrong with police unions” should help us to
ﬁgure out what sort of labor law would be desirable or, at least, what
normative commitments should be furthered by labor regulation.
351. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 12, at 721.
352. See Gude, Support Police Unions, supra note 65.
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For policing scholars, police unions similarly should force hard
questions: To what extent is the call for reform a call for “community” or
“democratic” policing, which in turn rests on some vision of liberal
reform?353 If so, what sorts of illiberal policies might be acceptable to
ensure that regulators can bring police to heel? To the extent that critique
comes from a place of radicalism, though, should that change the calculus
as to which tactics are desirable? If the ultimate goal is abolishing police,
does that call for or justify support for legal or procedural tactics that
strengthen other problematic state institutions?354 That is, recognizing
“what’s wrong with police unions” should help us understand what sort of
policing oversight might be sufficient and exactly how deep the structural
critiques of policing in the United States go.
Answering these questions is and will be a tall order. Taking police
unions seriously has already paid dividends for scholars and activists
concerned about policing’s role as a driver of inequality. But taking police
unions seriously should require a deeper understanding of their place not
only in the criminal system, but also in broader discussions about worker
power and law enforcement in the political economy of postindustrial
capitalism.

353. See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 72, at 1832 (arguing that an
administrative oversight model would serve as an effective means of ensuring police
oversight).
354. Cf. Levine, Discipline and Policing, supra note 38, at 844–45 (arguing that support
for stripping police of procedural protections could backﬁre or legitimate ﬂawed aspects of
the criminal system).
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